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ABSTRACT  
 
This dissertation examines the structural properties of patterns in the decision-making 
processes used for information technology (IT) portfolio management with an emphasis on two 
key issues; (1) strategic alignment and (2) the mitigation of risks early-on during planning. Based 
on the cross sectional analysis of a large portfolio of decisions, I build on the Defender-
Prospector-Analyzer typology and the corresponding IT strategies to develop theoretical profiles 
of decision models in alignment with these archetypes. I theorize key differences in decision 
models across these three strategic orientations and empirically test hypotheses by analyzing 
actual decisions for a large portfolio of IT initiatives in a unique, naturally controlled empirical 
setting. By examining decision-making processes over a two-year consecutive period, I 
systematically address risk mitigation during IT portfolio planning. I build on the logic of 
appropriateness, to propose an endogenous explanation for the evolution of these planning 
routines. Using an organizational routine as the unit of analysis; I propose their characteristics 
that are likely to explain the generation, deletion, retention and adaptation of these routines over 
time. I corroborate my hypotheses in a unique empirical setting using a three-stage methodology. 
This dissertation examines strategic alignment and risk-taking from an inductive perspective. 
Findings reported in this dissertation, based on minimal assumptions, indicate that a pattern-
enabled approach to planning for IT portfolios can potentially alleviate the planning paradox. 
Decision trees I present offer insights for alignment and have substantial managerial implications 
for IT governance. Meta-routines presented in this dissertation — based on the evolutionary 
analysis of routines over a two-year period — give us a visual vocabulary for articulating the 
anatomy of dynamic capabilities. These findings have substantial implications for improving the 
maturity of IT portfolio management processes within organizations. 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To My Mother and Father 
 iv 
ACKOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This dissertation would not have been possible without the support of many people. I 
thank Mike Shaw, for his guidance. Also thanks are due to my committee members, Joe 
Mahoney, Ram Subramanyam, and John Chandler, for their encouragement. Many thanks are 
due to the Department of Business Administration at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign for providing me with financial support over the years.  
Many thanks are due to my family: Purushottam, Padma, Prashant, Anagha, Arohi and 
Ankita Karhade for their unwavering love. Thanks are also due to my numerous loyal friends 
who endured this long process with me; always offering support. 
 v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1 
 
1.1. NATURE OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM ..................................................................... 1 
 
1.1.1 Importance of Research on Decision-Making ............................................................... 3 
1.1.2 Gaps in the Research Literature ..................................................................................... 4 
 
1.2. PURPOSE OF THIS DISSERTATION RESEARCH ........................................................ 5 
 
1.2.1. Objectives ..................................................................................................................... 5 
1.2.2. Contributions................................................................................................................. 6 
 
CHAPTER 2: PATTERNS IN IT PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT DECISION MAKING ......... 7 
 
2. 1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 7 
 
2.2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ..................................................................................... 9 
 
2.2.1 Complexity of the Decision-making Process ............................................................... 10 
2.2.2 Strength of Themes in the Decision-making Process .................................................. 11 
2.2.3 Mix of Attributes used in the Decision-making Process ............................................. 12 
2.2.4 Decision Trees: Representing Outcomes of the Decision-making Process ................. 13 
 
2.3. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF DECISION-MAKING ............................................... 17 
 
2.3.1 Stage One: Generating Decision Models ..................................................................... 17 
2.3.2 Stage Two: Comparing Decision Models .................................................................... 30 
 
2.4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS ........................................................................................... 31 
 
CHAPTER 3: EVOLUTION OF ROUTINES ............................................................................. 36 
 
3. 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 36 
 
3. 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND .................................................................................. 38 
 
3.2.1. Logic of Appropriateness ............................................................................................ 38 
3.2.2. Appropriateness of Routines used for IT Portfolio Management ............................... 43 
3.2.3. Hypotheses: Evolution of Routines ............................................................................ 44 
 
 vi 
 
3.3. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF ROUTINES ........................ 51 
 
3.3.1 Stage One: Extracting Organizational Routines .......................................................... 54 
3.3.2 Stage Two: Evolutionary Outcomes ............................................................................ 67 
3.3.3 Stage Three: The Evolutionary Process ....................................................................... 70 
 
3.4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS ........................................................................................... 71 
 
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUDING COMMENTS ............................................................................. 78 
 
4.1. LIMITATIONS .................................................................................................................. 78 
 
4.2. IMPLICATIONS FOR IT PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT ............................................. 79 
 
4.3. IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH ................................................................................. 86 
 
4.4. FUTURE WORK ............................................................................................................... 91 
 
5. REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 92 
 
APPENDIX A: DETERMINATION OF THE STRATEGIC ORIENTATION ........................ 103 
 1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. NATURE OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
 
Executive decision-making on Information Technology (IT) initiatives is critical to 
organizational performance (Piccoli & Ives 2005, Dhar & Sundararajan 2007). Such initiatives 
have delivered a variety of benefits in the past; changed the competitive landscape (McFarlan 
1984, Clemons & Weber 1990); improved transaction processing and enterprise resource 
planning efficiency (Camillus & Lederer 1985, Gattiker & Goodhue 2005, Cotteleer & Bendoly 
2006); and enabled inter-organizational cooperation (Johnston & Vitale 1988, Kumar & van 
Dissel 1996). At the same time, substantial losses due to failed IT initiatives or projects have also 
been reported. For instance, it has been reported that an estimated 68% of all IT projects are 
neither on time nor within budget, and furthermore they do not deliver their originally stated 
business goals. Some reports even claim that during the years from 2002 to 2004, over $100 
billion worth of IT projects within the United States have failed altogether (Standish Group 
2003, Jeffery & Leliveld 2004). 
            
To derive potential benefits from their investments in IT, executives also continue to be 
concerned with aligning their IT initiatives with organizational goals. Given the high value-at-
risk due to failed IT initiatives, senior executives are now devoting their attention to 
systematically managing risks associated with these IT initiatives during planning. But, 
executive attention is the limiting resource (Simon 1982). Executives simultaneously need to 
ensure that their plans are being developed after systematically managing risks associated with 
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IT initiatives (Dewan & Fei 2007). These twin challenges, alignment of initiatives and risk 
management are emerging as key concerns relevant for the strategic planning of IT portfolios. 
 
Several methodologies have been suggested for conducting planning for IT initiatives 
including business systems planning (IBM 1975, Lederer & Putnam 1986), portfolio 
management (McFarlan 1981), strategic systems planning (Holland Systems 1986), and 
information engineering (Martin 1982). Portfolio management (McFarlan 1981) is one such 
approach that has been relatively understudied; but is now gaining widespread executive 
attention. Unfortunately, there exists no single way to plan portfolios as there are several points 
of failures when managing IT assets. These points of failure are scattered across the entire IT 
lifecycle (Maizlish & Handler 2005). An aggregate view of portfolios nevertheless can assist 
planners to (1) systematically evaluate the benefits, risks and mitigation approaches relevant to 
the initiatives in their portfolio and more importantly (2) arrive at planning decisions using well-
defined consistent decision rules (McFarlan 1981).  
 
This dissertation examines the decision-making associated with planning for portfolios of 
organizational IT initiatives. Such initiatives (Piccoli & Ives 2005) are competitive moves that 
depend on the use of IT and are designed to improve a firm's position. Examples of such 
initiatives include business process reengineering initiatives, expansive enterprise resource 
planning (ERP)-enabled programs, customer service management programs and electronic 
business initiatives. These organizational programs are much broader in scope than information 
systems development (ISD) projects and encompass a much larger activity system, with IT being 
a critical resource.  
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1.1.1 Importance of Research on Decision-Making 
 
Executives responsible for planning need to grapple with at least two concerns. First, 
Gresham's law of planning states that "Daily routine drives out planning. Stated less cryptically, 
we predict that when an individual is faced both with highly programmed and highly un-
programmed tasks, the former tend to take precedence over the latter even in the absence of 
strong overall time pressure‖ (March and Simon 1958, p.185). Planners need to ensure that they 
adopt a portfolio perspective and devote attention to key planning issues. Secondly, the planning 
paradox suggests that planners are expected to complete planning rapidly so that plan 
implementation can commence; but doing so reduces the likelihood of success during 
implementation (Lederer & Sethi 1996).  
 
For instance, Jeffery and Leliveld (2004) found that when the North American division of 
a large foreign car manufacturer decided to subject its 352 initiatives to the rigors of portfolio 
diagnosis, only 30 core initiatives survived. Those that lacked clear links to business objectives 
were terminated. The estimated savings from adopting such a portfolio view of IS initiatives 
were $45 million on an annual basis. In this case, portfolio analysis revealed that the automaker 
had a myriad of conflicting unaligned projects. By adopting a portfolio-view of IT initiatives 
during planning, executives can obtain a more holistic view enabling them to focus their limited 
attention on the key planning concerns. A systematic understanding of the attributes that explain 
planning decisions on IT initiatives is thus important to improve the efficacy of planning. 
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1.1.2 Gaps in the Research Literature 
 
An extensive survey of the research literature on IT planning and alignment reveals the 
following two gaps that I intend to address in this dissertation. First, low success rates of plan 
implementations have been often attributed to inadequate attention to risk management during 
planning (Boynton & Zmud 1987). Thus, planners must first determine an ideal risk posture for 
their organization and then evaluate the extent to which this posture is embodied in the planned 
portfolios (McFarlan 1981). However, a systematic emphasis on risk assessment and 
management during planning (as opposed to during plan implementation) continues to be a 
relatively understudied area and this dissertation aims to fill this gap.   
  
Second, this dissertation also aims to fill a methodological gap. A substantial body of 
prior research that examines strategic IT planning issues (i.e. alignment and risk management) 
relies on survey-based methodologies (in particular the matched-pair survey research design). 
This dissertation maintains that systematically analyzing actual portfolio decisions in 
organizations and more importantly, examining the decision-making processes used to arrive at 
those decisions will enable the development of a better understanding of alignment and risk 
management during planning. By developing a data-driven methodology that relies on inductive 
methods, this dissertation provides a richer understanding alignment and risk management. 
Findings from this dissertation complement and augment the existing body of research on IT 
planning issues pertaining to alignment and risk management. 
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1.2. PURPOSE OF THIS DISSERTATION RESEARCH 
1.2.1. Objectives 
 
Portfolio thinking gives Chief Information Officers and other key stakeholders a 
holistic view of their investments, which has strong governance implications. This 
dissertation addresses two key issues pertaining to strategic IT planning; namely strategic 
alignment of IT initiatives and the systematic mitigation of risks associated with such IT 
initiatives early on during planning. To systematically study alignment, I build on the 
Defender-Prospector-Analyzer (Miles and Snow 1978) typology and the corresponding 
information technology (IT) strategies to develop theoretical profiles of decision models 
in alignment with these archetypes. I theorize key differences in decision models across 
these three strategic orientations and empirically test my hypotheses by analyzing actual 
decisions for a large portfolio of IT initiatives in a unique, naturally controlled empirical 
setting.  
 
To address risk mitigation during IT portfolio planning, building on the logic of 
appropriateness (March 1994), I propose an endogenous explanation for the evolution of these 
planning routines. Using an organizational routine as the unit of analysis; I propose their 
characteristics that are likely to explain the generation, deletion, retention and adaptation of these 
routines over time. I corroborate my hypotheses in a unique empirical setting using a three-stage 
methodology. In stage one, an inductive methodology enables me to systematically discover tacit 
decision routines used for prioritizing proposals of IT initiatives within a large portfolio. In stage 
two, by relying on the schemata of routines (i.e. the abstract representation of the routine) and 
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their application (i.e. the instantiation of an abstract routine) (Feldman and Pentland 2003); I 
determine the outcomes of the underlying, unknown evolutionary process over a consecutive 
two-year period. In stage three, inductive methods help me discover true, stable patterns of 
evolution to support my hypotheses.  
 
1.2.2. Contributions 
 
This dissertation contributes to the research on IT planning and portfolio management 
along at least three dimensions. First, based on minimal assumptions, a pattern-enabled approach 
to planning provides substantial advantages and can potentially alleviate the planning paradox. 
This dissertation examines strategic alignment and risk-taking from an inductive perspective. 
Decision trees I present offer insights for alignment and have managerial implications for IT 
governance.  
 
Second, I find that the appropriateness of routines is a key characteristic guiding their 
evolution over time. My dissertation has implications for research on (1) organizational routines, 
(2) organizational learning, and (3) dynamic capabilities. Implications for a pattern-enabled 
approach to IT portfolio management are developed. 
 
Third, my methodological approach enables me to codify tacit decision-making 
knowledge. This externalization of knowledge (i.e. conversion from tacit knowledge to 
explicit decision rules) has strong implications for effective knowledge management 
within organizations (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995).  
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CHAPTER 2: PATTERNS IN IT PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT DECISION MAKING 
2. 1. INTRODUCTION 
For most organizations today, expenditures in initiatives that critically depend on 
information technology (IT) are growing in size (Piccoli and Ives 2005)
1
. Large Fortune 100 
organizations often have hundreds or even thousands of initiatives running simultaneously 
(Jeffery and Leliveld 2004, Gartner 2008). Prioritizing these large numbers of initiatives such 
that they are aligned with business goals of the organization is a key challenge (King 1978, 
Boynton and Zmud 1987, Clemons and Weber 1990). IT portfolio management — defined as the 
practice of systematically prioritizing and managing these large collections of initiatives (Weill 
and Vitale 1999, Jeffery and Leliveld 2004, Maizlish and Handler 2005) — and alignment in the 
corresponding executive decision-making processes is critical for organizational performance 
(Venkatraman 1989, Sambamurthy and Zmud 2000, Dhar and Sundararajan 2007). From an IT 
governance standpoint, organizations can derive the potential gains from their investments if 
their IT-strategies are in alignment with their business goals (Clemons and Weber 1990, Brown 
and Magill 1994, Segars and Grover 1998, Sabherwal and Chan 2001, Bharadwaj and Tiwana 
2005, Oh and Pinsonneault 2007). Organizations rely on portfolio management practices to 
improve the governance of their initiatives and to ensure decisions are made in a systematic 
manner using aligned decision rules.  
Anecdotal evidence reveals at least two substantial gains from adopting portfolio thinking 
for managing IT initiatives (Potts 2008), specifically in the form of improved IT governance. 
First, portfolio thinking can improve the transparency of the decision-making rationale used 
during strategic IS planning (for e.g., Gartner 2008). Consider as an illustration, the viewpoint of 
                                                 
1
 I study IT-dependent initiatives (Picolli and Ives 2005): from now onwards referred to as 
initiatives.  
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the CIO of KeySpan Energy, Frank LaRocca: ―[after adopting portfolio management practices] 
there was much less skepticism about the value of the projects and a richer dialogue about IT 
and business strategy was possible."  Further, LaRocca notes additional benefits the portfolio 
approach offered —"it has re-established our credibility and trust and has allowed senior 
executives to get engaged with IT at a much more strategic level" (Hoffman 2005). Second, 
portfolio thinking can also help key stakeholders ascertain alignment between IT and business 
strategies by giving them the ability to holistically examine their decision-making rationale. 
Critical to improving IT governance is the ability of executives to monitor decisions about major 
technology initiatives. For example, effective monitoring of large-scale initiatives requires that 
decision makers ensure that key sources of risks are systematically managed during the planning 
process (for e.g. Vitale 1986, Gupta and Raghunathan 1989, Raghunathan and Raghunathan 
1989, Nidumolu 1996, Schmidt et al 2001, Alter and Sherer 2004, Grover and Segars 2005). As 
a case in point, FedEx created an IT oversight committee that included board members who 
oversaw decisions including risk mitigation plans on major IT initiatives (Hoffman 2004). While 
anecdotal evidence, such as the above, brings to light the relevance of portfolio management 
practices, I maintain that rigorous research that examines the characteristics of decision-making 
processes and strategic alignment is much needed.  
This research study seeks to contribute to the extant literature on alignment and strategic 
management of IS by pursuing three goals. First, by adopting a theory driven approach, I build 
on prior research on the Defender-Prospector-Analyzer typology (e.g., Miles and Snow 1978,  
Kabanoff and Brown 2008) and the corresponding IS strategies (Sabherwal and Chan 2001) to 
develop theoretical profiles for decision models in alignment with these archetypes. Though 
prior research has examined various aspects of decision-making processes (for e.g. Sabherwal 
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and King 1995, Bharadwaj and Tiwana 2005), I find that there exist few studies that examine 
actual decision-making during strategic IS planning. To the best of my knowledge, my study is 
the first of its kind in this evolving stream of research and thus would augment the existing body 
of knowledge on alignment. Second, I incorporate insights from research on actual decision-
making processes (Tessmer et al. 1993, Gentry et al. 2002) and theorize key structural properties 
of decision models in alignment with the three archetypes. I test my hypotheses in a unique 
empirical setting.  Third, my findings, based on the inductive analysis of a unique portfolio data 
set which contains initiatives that were approved and more importantly initiatives that were 
rejected, complement existing survey-based insights on alignment
2
. 
 
2.2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The Miles and Snow (1978) Defender-Prospector-Analyzer typology suggests that the 
fundamental difference in these three business strategies is the rate of change preferred in the 
organizational domain. Defenders are characterized by their risk-averse nature, their emphasis on 
operational efficiency, a focus on a narrow domain through control of secure niches in their 
industry, and limited new product development efforts. In contrast, Prospectors are risk takers, 
who constantly explore emerging opportunities by stressing new product development. While 
Defenders and Prospectors represent extreme ends of the spectrum, Analyzers exhibit traits of 
both Defenders and Prospectors. Like Defenders, they are considered risk averse as they enter 
new markets only after they have been explored by other Prospectors, but they often try to 
achieve a balance between the two conflicting perspectives.  
                                                 
2
 For an extensive review of the literature on IT alignment, see Chan and Reich (2007). 
 10 
Given these systematic differences in the goals associated with these strategic archetypes, 
in order to be in alignment with their business objectives, I expect systematic differences in the 
corresponding decision-making processes used by organizations pursuing these different 
strategies. Building on prior research on the analysis of decision making (for e.g., Tessmer et al. 
1993, Gentry et al. 2002), I hypothesize differences in decision models across three strategic 
orientations along three key dimensions.   
 
2.2.1 Complexity of the Decision-making Process 
Because of its stable domain, decision-making in the Defender tends to be oriented 
towards exploitation (March 1991). Defenders tend to discourage environmental scanning and 
instead focus on long-range planning. The Defender’s inclination to perceive a relatively simple 
environment permits an intensive approach to planning that is likely to take into consideration 
only a narrow spectrum of factors. Defender decision-making processes and the resulting 
decision models are expected to be of low complexity. Since the Prospector continuously 
monitors an eclectic array of external events, it must process a diverse flow of information about 
conditions in potential domains of operation. Thus, decision-making for a Prospector is usually 
broad rather than intensive and tends to be oriented towards exploration (March 1991). 
Prospectors perceive a complex environment (Doty et al. 1993), which is likely to necessitate 
decision-making processes that take into consideration a broad spectrum of factors.  
The inclusion of a broader spectrum of factors is likely to lead to decision models for the 
Prospector that are likely to be more complicated when compared to Defender decision models. 
Analyzers adopt traits from both Prospectors and Defenders; seeking effectiveness through 
efficiency and new product development. Analyzers strive to achieve efficiency in their stable 
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domains and explore relatively new markets after they have been explored by other Prospectors. 
Given their dual focus of balancing exploitation and exploration, Analyzer decision-making 
processes are likely to take into account a broader spectrum of factors (Segev 1989). The 
resulting Analyzer decision models are thus likely to be most complicated. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The complexity of the Defender decision model is likely to be lower 
than the complexity of the Prospector decision model; which in turn, is likely to 
be lower in complexity when compared to the Analyzer decision model. 
(Complexity of Decision Model) Defender < Prospector < Analyzer  
 
2.2.2 Strength of Themes in the Decision-making Process 
Defenders create a stable domain by developing a single-core technology that is highly 
cost-efficient. Defenders grow mainly through market penetration and perhaps through limited 
new product development. Relying on their intensive decision-making processes, Defenders are 
likely to maintain stability in their environment by adopting strong, singular decision-making 
themes focused on efficiency improvements (for e.g., Camillus and Lederer 1985). Prospectors 
maintain a continuously evolving dynamic domain, by monitoring a wide range of environmental 
conditions, in search of new product development opportunities. Such dynamism in the 
environmental condition is likely to translate to a decision-making process that relies on a broad 
spectrum of factors and continues to be tentative. This tentativeness in the decision-making 
process is likely to manifest in decision models for Prospectors that lack strong decision-making 
themes (Zahra and Pearce 1990).  
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Given the Prospector’s goal ─ a focus on growth through the exploration of new 
opportunities ─ I maintain that decision-making processes for Prospectors are likely to be 
characterized by some decision-making themes; but ones of lower strength when compared to 
those that represent Defender decision-making. Analyzers exploit new product opportunities, 
while maintaining a firm base of traditional products; therefore, have a dual technological core 
encompassing a stable and a flexible component (Slater et al. 2006). Given these dual goals, I 
maintain that decision-making processes for the Analyzer are not likely to contain the presence 
of any strong unifying themes. In other words, Analyzer decision-making processes are likely to 
be characterized by the presence of weak themes even when compared to Prospector decision-
making models.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Defender decision-making processes are likely to be characterized 
by the presence of stronger themes when compared to themes in Prospector 
decision-making; themes in Prospector decision making are likely to be stronger 
than themes characterizing Analyzer decision-making. 
(Strength of Theme) Defender > Prospector > Analyzer  
 
2.2.3 Mix of Attributes used in the Decision-making Process  
Defenders tend to be risk averse and maintain stability in their domain by engaging in 
intensive planning that is likely to be characterized by the presence of strong decision-making 
themes focused on efficiency improvements. Similarly, Analyzers are risk averse and are likely 
to enter new markets only after they have been explored by other Prospectors (Kabanoff and 
Brown 2008). Unlike Defenders and Analyzers, Prospectors thrive on change in the environment 
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and often are likely to create this change by taking risks. To be in alignment with their strategic 
goals, Defender and Analyzer decision-making is thus expected to more heavily focus on 
systematically managing and mitigating risks to the extent possible (Lambert 1986). These low 
risk preferences of Defenders and Analyzers are likely to manifest themselves in their decision-
making processes, which are likely to consume a broad spectrum of factors that pertain to the 
risks and risk mitigation mechanisms (Lambert 1986) associated with their proposed initiatives.  
Benefit attributes — information regarding the potential benefits that can be extracted 
from proposed initiatives — are more likely to be associated with exploration and these factors 
are likely to be more pronounced in Prospector decision-making. Difference in the degree of risk 
aversion between Prospectors and both Defenders and Analyzers (Hambrick 1983) is likely to 
manifest itself with a higher proportion of benefit related attributes consumed in Prospector 
decision-making when compared to the proportion of benefit related attributes consumed in 
Defender or Analyzer decision-making. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The proportion of benefit attributes included in decision models by 
Prospectors is likely to be greater compared to the proportion of benefit attributes 
included in decision models by Defenders and Analyzers. 
(Proportion of Benefit Attributes Included in Decision Models)  
Prospector > Defender, Prospector > Analyzer  
 
2.2.4 Decision Trees: Representing Outcomes of the Decision-making Process 
Rationale used during decision-making can often be tacit (Cyert and March 1963). 
Decision trees are effective approximations of this tacit knowledge contained within a decision 
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process (Quinlan 1990). Inductive learning methodology discovers and represents this tacit 
knowledge contained in a decision process in a comprehensive way. Decision tree 
representations compactly describe the target concept — the tacit decision rules — using a set of 
conjunctives (Quinlan 1986). Trees create an ordering among the decision-making attributes 
characterizing examples that belong to a particular decision class and the ones that do not. 
Decision models possess predictive validity comparable to other statistical classifiers (Mingers 
1989). Furthermore, trees represent decision-making knowledge in a form that can be easily 
understood and scrutinized by human decision makers. Decision trees are approximations that 
represent the nature of questioning that is often involved in prioritization and can be effective for 
developing narratives explaining decision themes. Given this structured, comprehensive 
approach to discovering and representing the underlying structure of the data, decision trees 
possess high descriptive validity and offer advantages over statistical classifiers (Tessmer et al. 
1993). My methodological approach enables me to codify tacit decision-making knowledge. This 
externalization of knowledge has strong implications for effective knowledge management 
within organizations (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). 
Figure 1 presents an abstract representation of the hypothesized differences in the 
decision models across the three different strategic archetypes. The three hypotheses developed 
in the prior section can now be tested by using the structural properties of decision trees. An 
interpretation of the paths in decision trees provides insights concerning the underlying structure 
of the data, which highlights a collection of attributes used during decision-making. The length 
of (or the width or the number of decision attributes included in) the decision tree effectively 
represents the complexity of the underlying decision process.  
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Figure 1: Hypotheses: Differences in Decision Models 
 
LEGEND
DEFENDER PROSPECTOR ANALYZER
Benefit Attribute
Risk/ Risk Mitigation Attribute
Strong Decision Making Theme
Weak Decision Making Theme
 
The number of examples classified on a particular decision path serves as an effective 
proxy for the strength of the decision theme and guides me in the discovery of strong themes or 
patterns during decision-making. 
The kinds of attributes included in the decision trees reveal underlying preferences of 
decision makers to make decisions based on certain kinds of information attributes. Given that it 
is often possible to characterize decision attributes as belonging to one of the two categories 
(ones describing the potential benefits a proposed initiative can offer, and ones regarding the 
nature of risks and risk mitigation mechanisms associated with the given initiative) I can develop 
measures of the proportion of benefit related attributes contained in the decision model.  
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Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Complexity of Decision Models 
 DEFENDER 
Low decision-making 
complexity 
PROSPECTOR 
Medium decision-making 
complexity 
ANALYZER 
High decision  
making complexity 
Length 
of model 
Length of Defender’s Model  <  Length of Prospector’s Model  <  Length of 
Analyzer’s Model 
Hypothesis 2: Strength of Themes in Decision-making 
 DEFENDER 
Strong decision-making 
theme 
PROSPECTOR 
Medium decision-making 
themes  
ANALYZER 
Weak decision-
making themes  
Strength 
of main 
path 
Strength of theme (Defender’s Model)  >  Strength of theme (Prospector’s 
Model)  > Strength of theme (Analyzer’s Model) 
Hypothesis 3: Mix of Attributes used in Decision-making 
 DEFENDER 
Low Risk Appetite 
PROSPECTOR 
High Risk Appetite 
 
 
Benefit 
attributes  
Proportion of benefit attributes in the Prospector’s Model  > Proportion of 
benefit attributes in the Defender’s Model 
  PROSPECTOR 
High Risk Appetite 
ANALYZER 
Low Risk Appetite  
Proportion of benefit attributes in the Prospector’s Model  > Proportion of 
benefit attributes in the Analyzer’s Model 
 
Thus the complexity of the underlying decision-making process, themes in decision-
making and the mix of decision attributes used to arrive at decisions can be effectively studied 
by relying on structural properties of decision trees. These structural properties of decision trees 
(length, strength of the main path, and the proportion of benefit attributes in the model) serve as 
effective proxies for my hypothesized outcomes. The hypothesized decision models across the 
three different strategic orientations or archetypes can be tested by relying on this inductive 
learning approach. Table 1 summarizes my three hypotheses and restates them in terms of the 
structural properties of decision trees which are effective approximations of the underlying, 
unknown, decision-making processes. 
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2.3. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF DECISION-MAKING 
I adopt a research methodology with two stages to investigate my research questions and 
to test my hypotheses in a unique research setting. The first stage of my methodology was 
mainly concerned with the generation of decision models across three business units pursuing 
three different business strategies. The second stage of my methodology was mainly concerned 
with the systematic comparison of decision models across the three different business strategies 
to comprehensively test my hypotheses. 
 
2.3.1 Stage One: Generating Decision Models 
I choose a large Fortune 50 organization as my research site. Specifically, I selected a 
large multi-business subsidiary of this organization for further analysis. Within this subsidiary, I 
focus on three business units which were ascertained to pursue three different strategic 
orientations.  This field setting gives me a naturally controlled environment to systematically 
compare the impact of differences in strategic orientation on IT portfolio decision models. This 
was an opportune time to conduct the study as this was the first time within this organization, 
where proposals for IT dependent initiatives were pooled across several different business units 
for decision-making and were presented to a steering committee comprising the CIO, members 
of the CIO office and other senior business executives.  
I do not believe self-selection is a concern here. Managers proposing initiatives can 
―figure out‖ the decision rules used by planners and are likely to self correct their proposals only 
in the next year’s strategic IS planning session. 
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Data collection for stage one of my research methodology was a two-step process.  
  (1) Ascertaining the business strategy: Defensiveness and proactiveness of organizational 
decision makers (Miles and Snow 1978, Hambrick 1983, Segev 1989, Doty et al. 1993, 
Sabherwal and Chan 2001) have been argued to be some of the key indicators to identify 
different strategic orientations. Qualitative data exploring these dimensions were gathered via 
various mechanisms to ascertain the business strategy of a chosen business unit. Data were 
collected based on interaction with key informants of this steering committee (Vice President 
and CIO of this large multi-business subsidiary, and five senior business executives in the CIO 
office). For effective triangulation, data were collected by the following methods; content 
analysis of information presented in the annual reports; face-to-face semi-structured interviews 
with all key informants spanning 20 hours; unobtrusive participation in a planning session lasting 
two hours; conference calls with all informants spanning 20 hours; and exchange of several 
confidential documents between the researchers and the key informants. Based on the qualitative 
data collected for this investigation, the three business units within this subsidiary were chosen 
for analysis after they were ascertained to be pursuing three different business strategies. One 
business unit was classified as a Defender, another as a Prospector and the third business unit 
chosen for this study was classified as an Analyzer. Appendix A describes the process used to 
identify the strategic orientation of business units.  
I used the following criteria to select proposals to analyze for this study. The main 
objective of this selection process was to retain only initiatives pertaining to business 
applications of IS. Prior research has also exclusively focused on one kind of portfolio to study 
alignment (for e.g., Sabherwal and Chan 2001). Mandatory SOX-related proposals were 
eliminated as the decision-making for such proposals is not guided by the strategic orientation. 
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Similarly, proposals from a business unit strictly pertaining to IT infrastructure investments/IT 
hosting services intended to be shared across all businesses within this subsidiary were also 
eliminated. Furthermore, low priority initiatives were eliminated given their low substantive 
significance. By focusing only on these 161 proposals for IS initiatives (or business applications 
of IS), I believe I am accounting for alternative explanations for observed differences in 
decision-making (due to differences in different kinds of investments in IT infrastructure, etc) 
and can attribute differences in decision-making to differences in the strategic orientation of 
individual business units across this subsidiary. 
 
   (2) Portfolio data: This dataset contains 161 proposed IT-dependent initiatives across 
these 3 business units chosen for this study and the associated strategic planning decisions. These 
executive decisions are substantively significant as almost 30% of these 161 proposed initiatives 
were estimated to cost less than 100 thousand dollars each, and over 10% of these 161 initiatives 
were expected to cost more than 1 Million dollars each. Table 2 summarizes the attributes used 
for characterizing the portfolio data used in this study which were further analyzed using an 
inductive learning methodology.  
 
2.3.1.1 Portfolio Data and Measure Development 
2.3.1.1.1 Characterizing Risks 
Several different classical approaches have emerged in the literature with regards to risk 
assessment (Alter and Sherer 2004). Please see Lyytinen et al. (1998) for a systematic, 
comparative analysis of four classical approaches to risk management. I adopt McFarlan’s 
(1981) risk assessment approach for two reasons: (1) McFarlan’s (1981) model is geared towards 
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the analysis of portfolios and easily lends itself to my research objectives. (2) Decisions on 
initiatives within a portfolio require planners to compare the risk associated with two initiatives. 
McFarlan’s(1981) conceptualization of risk allows for easy comparison between initiatives. 
I adopt McFarlan(1981)’s measurement scheme for assessing the risk of proposed initiatives. 
 
Initiative Size:  This attribute was measured based on the estimated investment required to 
execute the initiative. The risk associated with an initiative increases with its size (McFarlan 
1981, Vitale 1986). This variable was assigned the following three values: low (required 
investment less than one hundred thousand dollars), medium (required investment greater than 
one hundred thousand dollars but less than one million dollars) and high (required investment 
was greater than one million dollars). This data transformation: converting from a continuous 
number representing the size of the initiative to three (low, medium and high) ranges was 
validated for me by the key planners at the site. 
 
Initiative Structure: Some initiatives by their very definition are well-defined in terms of their 
inputs and outputs. The corresponding organizational tasks required to execute such initiatives; 
to convert inputs to outputs, are relatively straightforward (Eisenhardt 1985). Initiatives where 
the expected outputs are vulnerable to change are low structured. Initiatives of high structure are 
less risky (McFarlan 1981) when compared to initiatives of low structure. This variable was 
assigned two values: high structure (well-defined objectives for the initiative) and low structure 
(initiative with relatively fluid objectives). 
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Prior Experience: As the familiarity of an organization with a technology increases, the 
likelihood of encountering technical problems reduces. Higher the prior experience with 
technologies used in the execution of initiatives, lower the risk associated with such initiatives 
(McFarlan 1981, Weill and Vitale 1999). This variable was assigned three values: low 
(initiatives with new, emerging technologies with low familiarity within the organization), 
medium (initiatives involving technologies when the familiarity with that technology was neither 
high nor low) and high (initiatives involving standard technologies highly familiar to the 
organization). 
 
2.3.1.1.2 Characterizing Benefits  
A rigorous quantification of benefits associated with initiatives (such as a ROI measure) 
would typically be a desirable decision-making aid. But often, arriving at such a numeric 
measure is extremely difficult given the bounded rationality of economic actors (Simon 1955) 
and the planning paradox (Lederer and Sethi 1988). The planning paradox as described by 
Lederer and Sethi (1988) states: Planners are often required to develop plans quickly in order to 
facilitate their implementation; but doing so can lead to inappropriate plans. 
 
Type of Potential Benefits 
Detailed discussions with the decision makers revealed the organizational challenges associated 
with quantifying the benefits associated with proposed initiatives. Further discussions revealed 
that especially in the early planning stages, ROI metrics were not exclusively used as decision 
making criteria. For large and substantively relevant initiatives, like the ones I examine in my 
study, key informants from the steering committee I interviewed on the site indicated that though 
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characterizing benefits was important, quantifying them with a number was not. In other words, 
decisions did not exclusively depend on such a numeric measure of benefits.  
These insights revealed that decisions on proposed initiatives were made on a tacit-level 
based on qualitative information on the types of benefits proposals were meant to provide. This 
insight guided me in the design of a data transformation. Detailed qualitative information on 
proposed initiatives was used to develop 5 qualitative measures on the kinds of potential benefits 
possible from proposals. I created 4 variables: operational support systems (OSS) benefits, 
marketing information systems (MIS) benefits, strategic decision support systems (SDSS) 
benefits and inter-organizational systems benefits. Proposed initiatives that had the potential to 
offer business processes improvements were also addressed by the creation of an additional 
variable named ―Process Improvements‖. Recommendations from prior research (Kettinger et al. 
1997, Broadbent et al. 1999, Sabherwal and Chan 2001) guided this transformation
3
. Thus, these 
five kinds of benefits that initiatives could potentially offer were used to create five variables to 
comprehensively characterize benefits associated with initiatives. These variables that richly 
characterize the benefits associated with proposed initiatives were tacitly used as decision 
criterion. Thus these variables also enable me to tease out aspects of decision making with 
regards to achieving strategic alignment.  
 
2.3.1.1.3 Mitigating Risks  
The successful implementation of large IT-dependent initiatives depends on several 
diverse kinds of capabilities (Piccoli and Ives 2005). Prior research has found support for three 
                                                 
3
 For e.g., based on the definitions presented in Sabherwal and Chan (2001), three raters individually used 
descriptive information on proposals to code these variables. For all the four types of initiatives the inter-
rater reliability was over 95%. Inconsistencies were amicably resolved by discussions between the three 
raters. I adopt the same naming convention for the sake of consistency. 
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categories of capabilities (a) software or technological capabilities (for e.g., Earl 1993), (b) 
capabilities pertaining to the management of software development processes or methodologies 
(for e.g., Ramasubbu et al. 2008), and (c) capabilities pertaining to the business process redesign 
implications of large initiatives (for e.g., Kettinger et al. 1997). Data on these three groups of 
decision criteria, used for systematically managing risks pertaining to these IT-dependent 
initiatives, are presented next. 
 
Software or Technological Capabilities 
Internal Technological Capabilities  
In-house Software Applications:  Software applications developed in-house potentially embed 
organizational knowledge (Earl 1993) and thus their use in the execution of proposed initiatives 
can be viewed as a risk mitigating factor. This variable was assigned a value of 1 if a proposed 
initiative could leverage a software application developed in-house or a value of 0 otherwise. 
 
External Technological Capabilities 
Specialized Software Applications: Organizations can potentially manage successful delivery of 
large initiatives by procuring specialized software products (Mitchell 2006). These partial 
solutions to specialized organizational problems can potentially expedite initiative progress and 
improve likelihood of success (McFarlan 1981). This variable was assigned a value of 1, if the 
initiative proposed the procurement of specialized software and a value of 0 otherwise. 
Third-Party Software Applications: Executives can potentially manage successful delivery of 
large initiatives by leasing third party technologies (McFarlan 1981). Third party applications 
model best practices and thus can expedite the delivery of proposed initiatives simultaneously 
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improving likelihood of success (Mitchell 2006). This variable was assigned a value of 1, if the 
proposed initiative recommended leveraging third party software applications and a value of 0 
otherwise. 
 
Process Capabilities 
Internal Maturity: Risks associated with an initiative decrease as the maturity associated with a 
proposed initiative increases (for e.g., Ramasubbu et al. 2008). Uncertainties associated with an 
initiative are often resolved by dedicating more resources to develop the plan for a proposed 
initiative and advancing it further along the software-development-life-cycle (SDLC) maturity 
phases. An idea that is more developed, further along the SDLC maturity phases, i.e., is likely to 
be less risky. This variable has been assigned three values: low (proposed initiative in its early 
stages of conception), medium (requirements and goals associated with the initiative are defined) 
and high (design of partial solutions to support the initiative was complete). 
 
External Capabilities: Specialized consultants can add value to large IT initiatives and 
integrating these external sources of knowledge can mitigate diverse sources of risks (Earl 1993, 
Mitchell 2006). Consultants can offer expertise in specific areas, and their exposure of several 
different organizational process contexts can be helpful in minimizing the likelihood of project 
failure (Dong-Gil et al. 2004). For each initiative, this variable was assigned a value of 1 when 
managers proposed leveraging capabilities from external partners and a value of 0 otherwise. 
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BPR (Business Process Redesign) Capabilities  
Technology-dependent initiatives often have substantial impact on the business processes of an 
organization. Large initiatives (with a strong technological component) can either constrain or 
facilitate BPR initiatives and vice versa (Broadbent et al. 1999). Managing the BPR implications 
of IT initiatives and vice versa is critical for successfully executing proposed initiatives. 
 
BPR Accomplished: Exerting effort and performing BPR tasks before starting IT-dependent 
initiatives is critical to minimizing process risks (Broadbent et al. 1999). This variable was 
assigned a value of 1 when BPR tasks were completed prior of the planning effort and a value of 
0 when the BPR tasks were not completed prior to planning. 
 
BPR Resources Committed: Identifying organizational resources and committing them for 
undertaking BPR tasks before starting initiatives can be a critical internal risk mitigation factor 
(Lambert 1986, Kettinger et al. 1997). This variable was assigned a value of 1 when resources 
were identified and assigned to proposed initiatives for conducting BPR tasks and a value of 0 
otherwise. 
 
2.3.1.1.4 IS Portfolio Decisions 
A steering committee comprising of the CIO and senior business executives were responsible for 
portfolio planning decisions. Decisions on each proposed initiative belonged to one of the 
following three classes: the proposed initiative (a) was rejected; (b) was approved with partial 
funding (c) was approved with full funding. Summary of the portfolio data used for analysis in 
this study is presented in Table 3.  
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Table 2: Defining Portfolios 
 Variable Variable renamed in the 
decision tree 
Prior Literature Values Interpretation of the values 
 Characterizing Risks Associated with Proposed Initiatives 
1 Initiative Size Initiative Size? McFarlan(1981)  
Vitale (1986) 
Low/Medium/High Risks increase with initiative size  
2 Prior Experience  Prior Experience? McFarlan(1981) 
Weill and Vitale ( 1999)  
Low/Medium/High Risks decrease as prior experience with 
technology increases 
3 Initiative 
Structure  
Initiative Structure? McFarlan(1981) 
Eisenhardt(1985) 
Low Structure or 
High Structure 
Initiatives with high structure are less 
risky compared to low structured 
initiatives.  
 Characterizing Benefits Associated with Proposed Initiatives 
1 Initiative Type Efficiency Improvements? 
Marketing Systems? Inter-
Organizational Systems? 
Strategic Systems? 
Sabherwal and 
Chan(2001) 
 
OSS and/or MIS 
and/or 
IOS and/or SDSS 
Benefits 
Operational support (OSS), 
supplier/customer coordination (IOS), 
strategic benefits (SDSS), explore new 
markets/opportunities (MIS) 
2 Process 
Improvements 
Process Improvements? Kettinger et al. (1997) 
Broadbendt et al. (1999) 
Yes/No IS investments which enable process 
improvements are desirable 
 Mitigating Risks Associated with Proposed Initiatives 
 Software or Technological Capabilities 
1 In-house Software 
Applications 
Leverage In-house 
Applications? 
Earl (1993), Mitchell 
(2006) 
 Yes/No Minimize risks be leveraging internal 
sources of knowledge 
2 Specialized 
Software 
Applications 
Purchase Specialized 
Applications?  
McFarlan (1981), Mitchell 
(2006) 
 Yes/No Manage risks be purchasing partial 
solutions 
3 Third Party 
Software 
Applications 
Use Third-Party 
Applications? 
Earl (1993), Mitchell 
(2006) 
 Yes/No Manage risks be leveraging partial 
solutions 
 Process Capabilities  
1 Internal Maturity  Internal Maturity? Ramasubbu et al. (2008)  Low/Medium/High More mature initiatives are less risky 
2 External 
Capabilities 
Use External Capabilities? Dong-Gil et al. (2004) 
Mitchell (2006) 
 Yes/No Manage risks be seeking external 
knowledge 
 Business Process Redesign (BPR) and Process Risks 
1 BPR 
Accomplished 
BPR Accomplished? Broadbendt et al. (1999)  Yes/No Completing BPR before starting IS 
initiatives can minimize process risks  
2 BPR Resources 
Committed 
BPR Resources Committed? Kettinger et al. (1997), 
Broadbendt et al. (1999) 
 Yes/No Committing resources before 
commencing on IS initiatives can 
minimize process risks 
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Table 3: Portfolio Data Summary 
Inputs to the decision process Outputs: 
Executive 
Decisions 
Strategic 
Orientation 
Benefits Associated With 
Initiatives 
Risks/ Risk Mitigation Mechanisms Associated with Initiatives 
Defender’s 
Portfolio of 
Proposed 
Initiatives   
(n=72) 
Initiative Type 
OSS Benefits (82%) 
MIS Benefits (61%)  
IOS Benefits (60%)  
SDSS Benefits (24%) 
Process Improvements (93%) 
Initiative Structure (Low Structure = 26%, High Structure = 74%) 
Initiative Size (Low = 28%, Medium = 61%, High = 11%)  
Prior Experience (High = 57%, Medium = 36%, Low = 7%) 
BPR Accomplished (Yes = 4%), BPR Resources Committed (Yes = 39%) 
In-house Software Apps. (Yes = 11%), Specialized Software Apps. (Yes = 11%), Third Party 
Software Apps. (Yes = 31%), Internal Maturity (Low = 19%, Medium = 68%, High = 12%), 
External Capabilities (Yes = 17%) 
Reject 
Initiatives 
(8%) 
Fully Fund 
Initiatives    
(92%) 
Prospector’s 
Portfolio of 
Proposed 
Initiatives   
 (n=32) 
Initiative Type 
OSS Benefits (56%) 
MIS Benefits (16%)  
IOS Benefits (50%)  
SDSS Benefits (34%) 
Process Improvements (78%) 
Initiative Structure (Low Structure = 50%, High Structure = 50%)  
Initiative Size (Low = 37%, Medium = 59%, High = 3%)  
Prior Experience (Low = 81%, Medium = 19%) 
BPR Accomplished (Yes = 12%), BPR Resources Committed (Yes = 53%) 
In-house Software Apps. (Yes = 12%), Specialized Software Apps.  (Yes = 9%), Third Party 
Software Apps. (Yes = 12%), Internal Maturity (Low = 75%, Medium = 25%), External 
Capabilities (Yes = 9%) 
Reject 
Initiatives 
(50%)  
Fully Fund 
Initiatives 
(50%) 
Analyzer’s 
Portfolio of 
Proposed 
Initiatives   
(n=57) 
Initiative Type 
OSS Benefits (79%)  
MIS Benefits (53%)  
IOS Benefits (49%) 
SDSS Benefits (32%) 
Process Improvements (82%) 
Initiative Structure (Low Structure = 32%, High Structure = 68%)  
Initiative Size (Low = 23%, Medium = 61%, High = 16%)  
Prior Experience (Low = 67%, Medium = 23%, High = 10%)   
BPR Accomplished (Yes = 16%), BPR Resources Committed (Yes = 23%) 
In-house Software Apps. (Yes = 8%), Specialized Software Apps. (Yes = 28%), Third Party 
Software Apps. (Yes = 22%), Internal Maturity (Low = 70%, Medium = 28%, High = 2%), 
External Capabilities (Yes = 56%) 
Reject (25%)  
Partially 
Fund 
Initiatives 
(30%)  
Fully Fund 
Initiatives 
(45%) 
Total 
Portfolio  
of Proposed 
Initiatives   
(n=161) 
Initiative Type 
OSS Benefits (76%) 
MIS Benefits (49%)  
IOS Benefits (54%)  
SDSS Benefits (29%) 
Process Improvements (86%) 
Initiative Structure (Low Structure = 33%, High Structure = 67%)  
Initiative Size (Low = 28%, Medium = 61%, High = 11%)  
Prior Experience (Low = 65%, Medium = 28%, High = 7%) 
BPR Accomplished (Yes = 10%), BPR Resources Committed (Yes = 36%) 
In-house Software Apps. (Yes = 10%), Specialized Software Apps. (Yes = 17%), Third Party 
Software Apps. (Yes = 24%), Internal Maturity (Low = 48%, Medium = 45%, High = 6%), 
External Capabilities (Yes = 29%) 
Reject 
Initiatives 
(22%) 
Partially 
Fund 
Initiatives 
(11%) 
Fully Fund 
Initiatives 
(67%) 
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2.3.1.2 Inductive learning methodology 
 
In its general form, the inductive learning process contains three phases: (1) the instance space; 
(2) an algorithm used for inductive learning; (3) a formalism to represent the output describing 
the target concept. The instance space is an n-dimensional space where each instance is 
described by n attributes and a classification concept. For every run of the learning algorithm, 
the instance space is represented by a training sample. In my case, the target concept is a 
description of the executive tacit decision process. The purpose of induction is to discover the 
most precise approximation of this target concept. From an instance space, an approximation of 
the target concept, called a hypothesis is induced. Each such approximation forms an instance in 
the hypotheses space. Each hypothesis, i.e. decision tree model, represents a more or less 
credible approximation of the underlying, unknown decision process. 
 
The standard method for inducing a decision tree from a training set of pre-classified 
examples, each of them described by a fixed set of attributes, is summarized as follows (Quinlan 
1986, 1990) 
• If all training examples belong to a single class, the tree is a leaf labeled with that 
class. 
Otherwise, 
— select a test, based on one attribute, with mutually exclusive outcomes; 
— divide the training sample into subsets, each corresponding to one outcome; and 
— repeat the same procedure with each subset. 
This procedure partitions the training sample into smaller subsets, in step with the growth 
of the induced tree. The selection of the most relevant attribute on which to split the training 
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sample efficiently has been a primary concern. Among several contingency table statistics and 
measures based on information theory, Mingers (1989) empirically shows that Quinlan's entropy 
criterion (Quinlan 1986) generates the smallest trees. 
 
Originating in thermodynamics, the concept of entropy has been used in information 
sciences since Shannon's contribution on message transmission (Shannon and Weaver 1963).  
An attribute's entropy, H = - ∑i pi log2 pi 
where i = 1…n; n = alternative events for this attribute; and pi  = the probability of alternative i, 
gives the amount of information or the reduction in uncertainty provided by an attribute, for 
classifying the training examples (Quinlan 1986). The entropy is equal to 0 if and only if all the 
pi’s but one are equal to 0, that is, the entropy vanishes when the outcome of an event is certain, 
and thus no valuable information is provided by the attribute. The entropy is maximum when all 
the pi’s are equal; that is, when all alternatives are equally likely, that is, the most uncertain 
situation exists. Any change toward an even distribution of pi’s increases the entropy but as soon 
as some alternatives become more probable than others the entropy decreases. 
 
The methodological approach to generate these alternative decision models per business 
unit is presented next. A randomly drawn sample of 50% of the portfolio was used for training 
and the prediction accuracy of the induced model was tested on a disjoint randomly drawn 
sample of 50% of the total portfolio. Every random sample was selected such that all the classes 
of the decision were represented; ensuring purity of induced trees. Trees were bootstrapped, 
randomized 20 times at this stage to generate alternative induced decision models. Each such 
induced decision model serves as a credible approximation of the underlying decision process. 
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To further improve the validity of the findings, the same analysis was conducted using a 
60%/40% training/testing sample split and a 70%/30% training/testing sample split. All the 
decision trees were induced by using the C4.5 learning algorithm (Quinlan 1986). Thus, I 
induced in total 60 decision models to comprehensively study the decision process for each of 
the three business units in the sample.   
 
2.3.2 Stage Two: Comparing Decision Models 
A group of 60 alternative decision models were generated across each business unit. Thus, in 
total these 180 models were then studied and elaborate structural data were collected on these 
decision models to test my hypotheses. Structural data collected on decision models pertained to 
the complexity of the underlying decision model (the length of the decision model, the width of 
the decision model and the total number of factors used in the decision model). The strength of 
the main path (the path that classifies the most number of examples) was used to represent 
themes in decision-making. Data were also collected on the proportion of benefit attributes that 
were included in the induced decision models to study the extent to which exploration was 
emphasized during decision-making.  
Simultaneously comparing decision models across these three dimensions helped me 
comprehensively compare decision models across business units pursuing different strategic 
archetypes. The structural properties of the 180 decision models were then systematically 
analyzed using ANOVA and MANOVA methodologies. Table 4 summarizes data collected 
based on the decision models generated in stage one. 
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Table 4: Structural Properties of Decision Models 
 DEFENDER PROSPECTOR ANALYZER 
 N = 60 Decision 
Models 
N = 60 Decision 
Models 
N = 60 Decision 
Models 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Overall Complexity of the decision model 
Length of 
model 
3.22 0.85 4.78 0.90 7.48 1.32 
Themes in decision-making 
Main Path 
Strength  
80.9% 11.5% 39.97% 6.6% 20.87% 6.33% 
Mix of Attributes used in decision-making 
% of benefit 
attributes  
23.63% 14.83% 36% 13.41% 26.06% 10.37% 
 
 
2.4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
Comparing decision models across the Defender and the Prospector yielded the following 
results. Given that 60 decision models were induced for each strategic orientation, I believe that 
violation of the normality assumption is not likely to be a concern here. The initial set of 
decisions from which these models were induced were also sufficiently large (72 decisions for 
the Defender, 32 decisions for the Prospector and 57 decisions for the Analyzer). The ANOVA 
with the length of the decision model (dependent variable) and type of strategic orientation 
(independent variable) was used to test H1.  
  
Hypothesis testing for H1 was comprehensively conducted using two other proxies 
(width and the number of attributes in the decision model) for the complexity of the decision 
model. All these three proxy measures revealed similar results and yielded similar insights. 
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The homogeneity of variances assumption was violated. But given that the largest 
standard deviation was never greater than the smallest standard deviation by a factor of 2, this 
violation is also not a concern for my analysis (Lindman 1974). 
 
I find the results support H1 (F(1,118) = 96.15, p = 0.000). Scheffe tests
4
 revealed that 
the difference in the Prospector and Defender tree lengths was 1.56. The ANOVA with the 
strength of the main path (dependent variable) and type of strategic orientation (independent 
variable) was used to test H2. The results support H2 (F(1,118) = 781.52, p = 0.000). Scheffe 
tests revealed that the difference between the strength of the main path in the Defender and 
Prospector was more than 47%. Finally, the ANOVA with the proportion of benefit variables in 
the decision model (dependent variable) and type of strategic orientation (independent variable) 
was used to test H3. The results support H3 (F(1,118) = 22.94, p = 0.000). Scheffe tests revealed 
that the difference between the proportion of benefit attributes used in the Prospector and 
Defender models was more than 12%.  
 
Comparing decision models across the Prospector and Analyzer yielded the following 
results. The ANOVA with the length of the decision model (dependent variable) and type of 
strategic orientation (independent variable) was used to test H1. I find the results support H1 
(F(1,118) = 170.72, p = 0.000). Scheffe tests revealed that the difference in the Analyzer and the 
Prospector tree lengths was 2.7. The ANOVA with the strength of the main path (dependent 
variable) and type of strategic orientation (independent variable) was used to test H2. The results 
support H2 (F(1,118) = 105.07, p = 0.000). Scheffe tests revealed that the difference between 
the strength of the main path in the Prospector and Analyzer was more than 12%. Finally, the 
                                                 
4
 Bonferroni and Sidak tests of contrasts revealed similar insights. 
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ANOVA with the proportion of benefit variables in the decision model (dependent variable) and 
type of strategic orientation (independent variable) was used to test H3. The results support H3 
(F(1,118) = 20.58, p = 0.000). Scheffe tests revealed that the difference between the proportion 
of benefit attributes used in the Prospector and Analyzer models was more than 9%.  
 
Finally, comparing models across the Defender and the Analyzer yielded the following 
results. The ANOVA with the length of the decision model (dependent variable) and type of 
strategic orientation (independent variable) was used to test H1. I find the results support H1 
(F(1,118) = 443.93, p = 0.000). Scheffe tests revealed that the difference in the Analyzer and 
Defender tree lengths was 4.26. The ANOVA with the strength of the main path (dependent 
variable) and type of strategic orientation (independent variable) was used to test H2. The results 
support H2 (F(1,118) = 1249.29, p = 0.000). Scheffe tests revealed that the difference between 
the strength of the main path in the Defender and Analyzer was more than 60%.  
 
A MANOVA was also conducted to consider the overall impact of strategic archetype on 
the three dependent variables comprehensively characterizing decision making across these three 
archetypes. Given that I have more than two groups, I rely on the Wilks’ Lambda statistic which 
was significant (p < 0.05); indicating that all the three dependent variables (i.e., complexity of 
the decision model, strength of the main path in the decision model and proportion of benefit-
related attributes included in the decision model) systematically vary across the different 
strategic archetypes. The MANOVA indicates complexity of decision models (F(2,177) = 
255.85, p = 0.000), strength of main path in the decision model (F(2,177) = 837.88, p = 0.000), 
and proportion of benefit attributes used in the decision model (F(2,177) = 15.217, p = 0.000) 
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are all significantly impacted by the chosen strategic orientation providing support for H1, H2 
and H3. 
 
There is a concern in the MANOVA, however, in that some of the dependent variables 
are correlated; the correlation between complexity of the decision model (measured in terms of 
the length of the longest decision path in each decision model) and the strength of the main path 
is -0.803 (p = 0.000); the correlation between the strength of the main path and proportion of 
benefit attributes in the decision model is -0.1476 (p = 0.048). 
 
Following up the significant results from the MANOVA, the Roy-Bargmann procedure 
was used to determine the impact of strategic orientation on the three dependent variables when 
controlling for the correlation between the structural properties of the decision models (Roy and 
Bargmann 1958, Finch 2007). The procedure was a three-step process in which variables were 
entered based on their theoretical importance (Finch 2007).  
In step one, complexity of the decision model (theoretically the most relevant variable) 
was tested in an ANOVA to confirm the significance of strategic archetype.  
In step two, the strength of the main path (theoretically the second most important 
variable) was tested using an ANCOVA to test for the effect of strategic archetype while 
controlling for complexity of the decision model (i.e., using complexity of the decision model as 
a covariate).  
Step three repeated the ANCOVA using the last variable, proportion of benefit-related 
variables included in the model to test for the effect of strategic orientation while controlling for 
both complexity of the decision model and the strength of the main path (included as covariates). 
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In all these three steps, the impact of strategic archetype on the dependent variable was 
significant.  
 
Thus, in other words, I did not find any evidence to suggest that structural properties of 
the decision models (i.e. complexity of the decision model and the strength of the main path) 
when incorporated as covariates had any mediating effect on the proportion of benefit related 
attributes used in the decision model. Hence, results of the three-step Roy-Bargmann procedure 
corroborate H1, H2 and H3 and suggest that the differences in the chosen business strategy 
significantly and consistently influence the structural properties of the corresponding decision 
models. 
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CHAPTER 3: EVOLUTION OF ROUTINES  
 
3. 1. INTRODUCTION 
For most organizations today investments in initiatives that critically depend on information 
technology (IT) are growing (Piccoli and Ives 2005). Fortune 100 organizations often have 
hundreds of such initiatives running simultaneously (Gartner 2008). Systematically prioritizing 
these large numbers of initiatives is a challenge (Clemons and Weber 1990). IT portfolio 
management — the practice of systematically managing collections of IT initiatives (Jeffery and 
Leliveld 2004) — and the appropriateness of the related decision-making is critical for 
organizational performance. From an IT governance perspective, organizations can derive the 
most value from their IT portfolios if they systematically manage their risk exposure early on 
during planning (Boynton and Zmud 1987, COBIT 2007). A recent survey of over two hundred 
IT executives revealed that emphasis on IT portfolio management practices is growing (Forrester 
2006). Portfolio thinking gives Chief Information Officers (CIO’s) and other stakeholders a 
holistic view of their investments. This holistic view has strong governance and risk implications 
(Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999, Xue et al. 2008). IT portfolio management is thus a key priority 
for most executives today. 
IT portfolio management nevertheless continues to be a complex activity for at least three 
reasons (Maizlish and Handler 2005). First, organizations have to prioritize large numbers of 
proposals for IT initiatives and the size of this decision problem is a source of complexity. 
Second, diverse sets of organizational stakeholders are responsible for IT portfolio management. 
Communicating tacit domain-specific knowledge — to other members of the group responsible 
for IT portfolio management — can often be difficult for every stakeholder. Third, stakeholders 
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responsible for IT portfolio management need to ensure that decision-making rationale used for 
prioritization is consistently applied to all the initiatives in the portfolio. A repertoire of well-
defined, decision routines can thus attenuate the planning paradox (Lederer and Sethi 1988); 
assist boundedly rational actors expedite planning and yet help them develop appropriate plans. 
Organizational actors are often required to learn to adapt their repertoire of routines as 
information technologies and their potential business applications are constantly evolving. 
Portfolio planners are thus expected to adapt their decision making rationale to benefit from 
possibilities in the evolving technological landscape. Though routines create a foundation of 
stability and simplify organizational action, they can also be viewed as a source of adaptation 
and flexibility (Feldman and Pentland 2003). Few research studies have examined the structure 
of this evolutionary process and examined the antecedents of this organizational learning; I 
intend to address these gaps by choosing an organizational routine as my unit of analysis.  
I contribute to research on routines and their evolution by pursuing four specific goals. 
First, by building on the logic of appropriateness (March 1994), I adopt a theory-driven approach 
and submit that appropriateness of routines is a key attribute guiding their evolution. Second, to 
the best of my knowledge, my empirical study is the first to endogenously explain the evolution 
of routines. Third, I incorporate insights on decision-making processes (Tessmer et al. 1993) and 
theorize the impact of endogenous structural properties of routines — appropriateness of 
routines, frequency of routine usage and routine complexity, after controlling for causal 
ambiguity of planned tasks — on their evolution. I corroborate my hypotheses in a unique, 
naturally-controlled empirical setting.  Finally, my findings, based on a rigorous inductive 
analysis of a unique longitudinal portfolio data set and the related prioritization decisions help 
me develop meta-routines explaining the evolution of routines. Meta-routines give us a visual 
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vocabulary for articulating the anatomy of dynamic capabilities. My findings have implications 
for improving the maturity of IT portfolio management. My study indicates that emergent change 
(Mintzberg and Waters 1985) can be characterized by systematic evolutionary paths guided by 
the appropriateness of routines.  
 
3. 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
3.2.1. Logic of Appropriateness 
March (1994, p. 58) proposes that decisions are often shaped by situational recognition, identity 
of decision makers, and application of rules. Logic of appropriateness serves as a theoretical 
foundation for my research
5
. Decisions result from decision makers answering for themselves the 
following question, ―What do actors like me (us) (1: Identity) do (2: Rules) in a situation like this 
(3: Recognition)?‖  
I elaborate the theoretical building blocks pertaining to the logic of appropriateness in 
decision making for IT portfolio management for two reasons. First, IT and their potential 
business applications are constantly evolving. Decision makers are expected to adapt to these 
evolving sets of possibilities and correspondingly adapt their routines (Maizlish and Handler 
2005). Second, large organizations are often managing hundreds of IT initiatives. Appropriate 
routines are relevant for IT portfolio management as they can expedite the planning effort and 
ensure that decision making rationale is consistently applied when prioritizing large numbers of 
initiatives (Byrd et al. 1995).  
                                                 
5
 Logic of appropriateness contrasts the dominant expected utility models (Luce and Raiffa 
1957) often referred to as logic of consequences. Prior research has adopted the logic of 
appropriateness as a theoretical foundation: See Weber et al. (2004) and Heide and Wathne 
(2006) as exemplars. 
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Figure 2: Issues in Planning 
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Two predicaments faced by planners during IT portfolio management are presented in 
Figure 2. First, Gresham's law of planning (March and Simon 1958, p.185) states that "Daily 
routine drives out planning
6‖.  Planners should devote their limited attention to planning 
concerns and not be distracted by tactical plan-implementation issues. Second, the planning 
paradox suggests that planners are expected to complete planning rapidly so that implementation 
of plans commences; but expediting planning can often lead to the development of inappropriate 
plans reducing the likelihood of success during implementation (Lederer and Sethi 1988). Rules
7
 
can address these challenges associated with planning via three mechanisms. First, rules assist 
the boundedly rational actor (Simon 1955); potentially simplifying his/her actions. Second, rules 
facilitate knowledge sharing by routinizing complex activities (Tsoukas 1996). Third, decision 
makers can use rules as incentive alignment mechanisms; (Eisenhardt 1985) rewarding rule-
following and penalizing rule-defiant behavior. Repertoire of rules assist planners expedite 
                                                 
6
 ―Stated less cryptically, we predict that when an individual is faced both with highly 
programmed and highly un-programmed tasks, the former tend to take precedence over the latter 
even in the absence of strong overall time pressure (March and Simon 1958, p.185)‖. 
 
7
 When decision rules are applied frequently, I maintain that the usage of that rule becomes an 
organizational habit. One way to define an organizational routine would be the application of a 
(tacit or explicit) decision rule with some (minimum) frequency. 
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planning and simultaneously develop appropriate plans. Identity of decision makers, a key 
building block in the logic of appropriateness is discussed next. 
 
3.2.1.1. Identity  
Identity of decision makers includes a set of idiosyncratic factors that they bring with them into a 
situation. Similar stimuli are likely to elicit different responses from organizational actors with 
distinct identities. In other words, in similar situations decision makers with different identities 
will behave differently. Correspondingly, different actions are likely to be deemed as appropriate 
for actors with different identities.  
For instance, strategies adopted by businesses are often used to develop identities for 
actors belonging to these different kinds of organizations. The Miles and Snow (1978) Defender-
Prospector-Analyzer classification is one such typology which has been often used for 
developing organizational identities (Segev 1989). Defenders are risk-averse; stress efficiency of 
operations; emphasize a narrow domain by aggressively controlling niches in their industry and 
engage in little or no new product development. Prospectors — at the other end of the risk 
spectrum — are risk-takers; constantly explore emerging opportunities and emphasize new 
product development. Analyzers exhibit characteristics of both Defenders and Prospectors and 
are risk averse. When planning portfolios of IT initiatives — performing essentially the same 
activity — decision makers with Analyzer-like identities are expected to prefer a higher 
proportion of low risk initiatives; decision makers with Prospector-like identities are more likely 
to prefer a higher proportion of high risk initiatives (Sabherwal and Chan 2001). A discussion on 
routines appropriate for actors with distinct risk-taking tendencies is presented next. 
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3.2.1.2. Routines 
March and Simon (1958, p. 140) define routines as follows:   
When a stimulus is of a kind that has been experienced repeatedly in the past, the 
response will ordinarily be highly routinized. The stimulus will evoke, with a 
minimum of problem-solving or other computational activity, a well structured 
definition of the situation that will include a repertory of response programs, and 
programs for selecting an appropriate specific response from the repertory. 
Two concepts define routines. First, is the idea of actors enacting an almost fixed response to 
pre-defined stimuli. Second, applying a routine, or applying an automatic response to a given 
situation often is accompanied by the absence of extensive search. Thus, routines can be defined 
by decision rules used by actors in situations described by a set of predefined stimuli. A routine 
or a rule thus identifies a set of contingencies that uniquely define a situation along with a 
managerial response (Nelson and Winter 1982). As the number of contingencies required for 
describing a situation increases, the complexity of the routine increases. This increase in routine 
complexity makes it difficult to effectively communicate this routine to other actors.  
The difficulty in communicating a complex routine can hinder its adoption; and diminish 
its usage in the future. On the other hand, as decision rules are frequently applied, they get 
engrained in the organization and create a stable foundation which simplifies future actions 
(Thompson 1967). Simplification assists the boundedly rational actor and facilitates retention of 
routines. Extensive usage of existing routines can also create inertia which discourages flexibility 
(Cyert and March 1963). For instance, routines for approving proposals of high risk initiatives 
during IT portfolio management could include a rich set of contingencies describing the nature of 
benefits that can be extracted from initiatives, diverse sources of risks associated with these 
initiatives and the related control mechanisms devised to mitigate these sources of risks. Rules 
serve as repositories of organizational experiences; these artifacts are described next. 
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3.2.1.3. Rules as Artifacts 
Rules are key artifacts within organizations. Scott (1998, p. 231) maintains that "organizations 
performing the simplest and most routine tasks rely primarily on rules to secure acceptable 
outcomes. Organizations carrying on even the most complex types of work perform many 
activities that are regulated by rules. Rules as structural devices represent agreements about how 
decisions are to be made or work is to be processed that predate the work performance itself." 
Rules can either be written (March et al. 2000) or can be largely tacit. Such unwritten rules 
represent norms which are shared tacit understandings that are created and sustained through 
interactions among group members (Markus et al. 2002). There exist several similarities between 
written and unwritten rules.  
First, rules are communicated through the process of socialization. Second, rules create 
standards for appropriateness (March 1981). Third, rules are self enforcing. Even when rules are 
unwritten and the internalization of rules is incomplete, rule following is enforced by other actors 
who are present (March et al. 2000). Rules thus are vital artifacts that facilitate the reproduction 
of social structure within organizations. These artifacts serve as repositories of organizational 
capabilities (Langlois 1995). Rules as artifacts accumulate past experiences. These artifacts are 
often the deliverables of learning investments which enable the retention of experiences over 
generations of rule followers (Zollo and Winter 2002). A discussion on the contingencies that 
routines describe — which help actors recognize decision making situations — is presented next. 
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3.2.1.4. Recognition  
A set of contingencies are often used to comprehensively describe decision-making situations. It 
is this set of contingencies that enables decision makers to recognize different decision-making 
scenarios and determine a course of action. For instance, when planning IT portfolios, decision 
makers with Analyzer-like and Prospector-like identities are expected to manage high risk 
initiatives differently (Miles and Snow 1978). Analyzers are risk averse and are likely to devise 
mechanisms to manage risk. Two perspectives on risk-taking (March and Shapira 1987) can 
guide managers: (1) managers — especially strategic planners — perceive risk-taking as a key 
expectation of their jobs and (2) managers take risks willingly believing that risk can be 
managed. Therefore, executives make a sharp distinction between gambling (where the odds are 
exogenously determined) and risk-taking (where managerial effort can control risks). Before plan 
implementation commences, executives with Analyzer-like identities are expected to exert effort 
(Lambert 1986) (gather information or develop skills) enabling them to manage risks. High risk 
proposals within a portfolio — comprehensively described by a set of certain contingencies — 
can be easily identified by risk-averse Analyzers and such a description is likely to help them 
devise mechanisms to manage these sources of risks.  
 
3.2.2. Appropriateness of Routines used for IT Portfolio Management 
Decisions result from decision makers answering for themselves the following question, ―What 
do actors like me (us) (1: Identity) do (2: Rules) in a situation like this (3: Recognition)?‖ These 
theoretical building blocks — identity of decision makers, rules and situational recognition — 
together help me define appropriateness (March 1994, p. 58). For instance, addressing sources of 
risks during planning is critical and appropriate for risk-averse Analyzers (Boynton and Zmud 
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1987). Appropriate behavior during planning requires planners with Defender- or Analyzer-like 
identities to arrive at approval decisions on high risk initiatives only after devising mitigation 
mechanisms to control risk. Planners with Analyzer-like identities who approve proposed high 
risk initiatives without devising mechanisms to control risk are gambling and behaving 
inappropriately. Rejecting a large majority of high risk initiatives without exerting any effort to 
manage risks is also inappropriate; as planners are expected to take some risks during planning. 
High risk initiatives should be appropriately approved by decision makers with Analyzer-like 
identities only after devising mechanisms to manage risks (March and Shapira 1987). Rules for 
approving high risk initiatives that show evidence of the presence of such mitigation mechanisms 
are defined to be appropriate (for risk averse Analyzers who should take risks intelligently).  
 
3.2.3. Hypotheses: Evolution of Routines 
March et al. (2000) studied the evolution of administrative rules (e.g. rules for allotting sick 
leaves, sale of surplus university property, etc) and academic rules (e.g. rules determining 
requirements for degree programs, rules for faculty appointments, promotions including tenure 
policy, etc) over an extended period.  
An example of an administrative rule from the March (et al. 2000) study guiding the 
conduct of students on the University campus is the Fundamental Standard ―(written in 1911) 
students at Stanford are expected to show both within and without the University such respect for 
order, morality, personal honor and the rights of others as is demanded of good citizens. Failure 
to do this will be sufficient cause for removal from the University." This rule remained 
unchanged until 1988 when it was changed following incidents pertaining to racial slurs on the 
Stanford campus. Based on these external events (e.g. racial slurs and abuses on the campus 
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grounds) the Fundamental Standard was extended to a new area for the first time in its entire 
history.  
An academic rule from the March (et al. 2000) study is the tenure policy at Stanford 
which reads that ―The first criterion for tenure is that the individual has achieved, or gives every 
promise of achieving, true distinction in scholarship. The published materials must clearly reveal 
that the person being proposed for tenure is among the very best in the field‖. The tenure policy 
was changed rarely (e.g. three times over a century in response to a few specific cases). 
Using an event history approach, March et al. (2000) explained the evolution of rules 
(rule births, revisions, and suspensions) based on the presence of exogenous factors. Covariates 
in this explanation of rule dynamics included factors such as changes in external environment 
(e.g. number of legislative acts enacted by the federal government that were related to higher 
education) and changes in organizational structure (e.g. changes in the organizational size in 
terms of the number of students) and changes in organizational complexity (e.g. number of 
academic programs offered at the university). Early in the century, at Stanford as elsewhere at 
American Universities, university presidents tended to ―make‖ written rules unilaterally. Only 
later in the century, as a response to the large organizational size, was the development of 
academic rules delegated to committees.   
The current study systematically differs from March et al. (2000) along at least three 
dimensions. First, I examine unwritten rules, norms which are shared tacit understandings that 
are created and sustained through interactions among group members. Scott (2001, p. 32) 
maintains that ―firms can thus be viewed as historical entities, their routines being the result of 
an endogenous, experience-based learning process.‖ Second, I propose an explanation for the 
evolution of these rules largely based on endogenous factors and the properties of routines 
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themselves. Third, my study — pertaining to the prioritization of IT initiatives — contributes to 
the existing research on IT planning and the evolution of IT planning routines. 
Routines create a foundation of stability (Nelson and Winter 1982); yet at the same time 
can be viewed as a source of flexibility and organizational adaptation (Feldman and Pentland 
2003, Garud et al. 2006). Information technologies and potential business initiatives that 
critically depend on IT are constantly evolving, and therefore require decision makers to 
constantly evolve their routines. Appropriateness of routines is a key factor guiding their 
evolution. The set of routines employed by an organization is thus expected to evolve to a more 
effective set of routines over time via at least two paths.  First, an organization is likely to 
employ two mechanisms of change that challenge the status quo — new routines of certain 
characteristics will be added to the existing repertoire of routines, and old routines of certain 
other traits will be discontinued from future use. Second, in addition to the retention of certain 
desirable routines, an organization is likely to adapt their routines before future use.  
I examine the outcomes of evolutionary change along four dimensions: (1) new routines 
are likely to be added to the repertoire of routines (rule births); (2) old routines are likely to be 
dropped from the existing repertoire of routines (rule deaths); (3) certain old routines are likely 
to be retained as-is for future use (rule retentions); and finally (4) certain old routines are likely 
to be adapted or modified before future use (rule revisions).  
I propose that these four outcomes are likely to be explained endogenously based on the 
characteristics of routines themselves (Feldman and Pentland 2003, Pentland and Feldman 
2005). The following sections develop my hypotheses that theorize the outcomes of the 
evolutionary process (Zollo and Winter 2002) based on three key characteristics of routines —  
(1) appropriateness of routines; (2) frequency with which a routine is applied and finally; and  (3) 
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complexity of the routine. My conceptual model is presented in Figure 3 and Table 5 summarizes 
my hypotheses. 
Figure 3: Conceptual Model 
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3.2.3.1. Challenging the Status Quo 
The repertoire of routines employed by an organization is expected to evolve to a more effective 
set of routines via two paths. First, inappropriate routines are expected to be discontinued from 
future use. Second, new appropriate routines are expected to be added to the repertoire of 
routines. These mechanisms challenge the status quo but improve the effectiveness of routines 
employed by an organization. These extreme changes to the repertoire of routines used by an 
organization (i.e., generation of new routines and discontinuing the usage of old routines) are 
likely to be implemented in gradual steps (Vaast and Levina 2006) due to at least two reasons.  
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Table 5: Hypotheses 
 Complexity of the 
Routine 
Appropriateness of 
the Routine 
Frequency of 
Routine Usage 
Evolutionary 
Outcome 
 Challenging the Status Quo: Adding New and Dropping Old Routines 
Rule Births and Rule Deaths 
H1 — — Appropriate Low Frequency 
Add 
Routine 
 
If (Is the Routine Appropriate? = “Yes”) & (Frequency of Routine Usage? 
= “Low”)  Add New Routine  
H2 — — Inappropriate Low Frequency 
Drop 
Routine 
 
If (Is the Routine Appropriate? = “No”) & (Frequency of Routine Usage? = 
“Low”)  Drop Old Routine  
 
Adopting the Status Quo: Retaining Old Routines 
Rule Retentions 
H3 
Low  
Complexity 
Appropriate 
High 
Frequency 
Retain 
Routine 
 
If (Is the Routine Appropriate? = “Yes”) & (Frequency of Routine Usage? 
= “High”) & (Routine Complexity? = “Low”)  Retain Routine As-Is 
H4 — — Inappropriate 
High 
Frequency 
Retain 
Routine 
 
If (Is the Routine Appropriate? = “No”) & (Frequency of Routine Usage = 
“High”) 
 Retain Routine As-Is 
 
Adaptation of the Status Quo: Modifying Old Routines 
Rule Revisions 
H5 
High  
Complexity 
Appropriate — — 
Modify 
Routine 
 
If (Is the Routine Appropriate? = “Yes”) & (Routine Complexity? = 
“High”)  
 Adapt Routine  
 
First, discontinuing the use of existing routines can cause disruption of organizational 
activities (Stinchcombe 1959). Second, introducing new routines or ―habits‖ can be difficult 
since they need to be effectively communicated to organizational actors before they can be 
adopted. Both these mechanisms of change are likely to be implemented in small, gradual steps 
by ensuring that the routines are only applied in relatively few decision instances (Nelson and 
Winter 1982). I expect that appropriate routines applied in relatively few instances are likely to 
be successfully incorporated in the repertoire of existing routines of an organization; whereas 
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inappropriate routines which used to be applied in relatively fewer instances in the decision 
space in the past are likely to be discontinued from usage or unlearned relatively easily. 
 
H1: Routines that are applied with a low frequency, and are appropriate are likely to 
be added to the repertoire of routines employed by an organization. 
 
H2: Routines that are applied with a low frequency, and are inappropriate are likely 
to be dropped from the repertoire of routines employed by an organization. 
 
3.2.3.2. Status Quo and Adaptation 
Routines can create inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1983). This attribute of routines creates 
stability, which assists the boundedly rational actor in efficiently implementing routinized tasks. 
This reuse of routines allows actors to offer an almost automatic response to a predefined set of 
stimuli (March and Simon 1958) thus minimizing the need for extensive search, and improving 
the effectiveness of decision making. Simple (low-complexity) routines can be effectively 
communicated to diverse sets of organizational actors and thus can be easily reused. Appropriate 
routines are more likely to be retained as they adhere to some criteria of appropriateness intrinsic 
to the identity of the concerned actors. The more frequently a routine is used, the greater is the 
likelihood of inertia associated with it; and which is more likely to facilitate the retention of that 
routine for future use.   
 
H3: Routines that are applied with a high frequency, and are appropriate, and are not 
complex are likely to be retained as-is for future use. 
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Routines that are frequently used are deeply ingrained in the organization. Such routines 
are often difficult to change even if they are inappropriate with regards to certain intrinsic criteria 
of appropriateness (Blau 1955, Stinchcombe 1959). Organizational inertia has a dark side, which 
facilitates the retention of these ―bad‖ habits, which cannot be easily unlearned. Given this dark 
side of organizational inertia created by the frequent application of routines (Hannan and 
Freeman 1983), I expect that inappropriate routines that are applied frequently are also likely to 
be retained as-is for future use.  
H4: Routines that are applied with a high frequency, and are inappropriate, are 
likely to be retained as-is for future use. 
Appropriate routines are more likely to be retained and less likely to be discontinued 
from future use since they adhere to some criterion of appropriateness. Reuse of routines — as 
an automatic response to predefined set of stimuli — is likely to be difficult when routines are 
complex (March and Simon 1958). Routines are likely to be easily reused only if the application 
of these routines simplifies actions for boundedly rational actors (Simon 1955). If the routine is 
of high complexity, actors are likely to find it difficult to reapply these routines. As the 
complexity of a routine increases, it is less likely to attract organizational adopters (Thompson 
1967). Appropriate routines of high complexity are likely to be reused more easily after they 
have been modified and simplified. I expect that appropriate routines of high complexity are 
likely to be adapted before future use.  
 
H5: Routines that are appropriate, and of high complexity are likely to be adapted or 
modified before future use. 
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3.3. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF ROUTINES 
 
I adopt a methodology with three stages to corroborate my hypotheses in a unique 
empirical setting. The first stage is dedicated to the generation of inductive models with the 
purpose of discovering (tacit) decision-making routines applied within this large organization. In 
stage two, sets of routines representing decision making over two consecutive years within this 
organization were systematically compared to determine the outcomes of the evolutionary 
process. The third stage was concerned with understanding the antecedents of the evolutionary 
process and systematically corroborating my hypotheses. To do so, multiple evolutionary models 
were induced to discover — with a high consistency and stability — the characteristics of 
routines that guided their evolution. My methodological roadmap is presented in Figure 4. 
Decision making — especially during strategic planning — has been represented as a 
complex network of issues involving a whole host of linkages, more or less tightly coupled. An 
analogy is that of ―the moving stream, a context in which issues float along, sometimes getting 
washed up on shore as actions, sometimes sinking and disappearing, and often bumping into 
each other with the effect of changing another's direction, slowing one down, speeding one up, 
joining two together, or having a single issue burst into several new ones‖ (Langley et al. 1995, 
p. 275). Mintzberg (1994) submits that plans are often formed, rather than formulated when 
actions converge into patterns; where analyses of planners involved in the effort merge into a 
fluid process of learning. Much "feel" is thus often involved in decision-making during planning. 
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Figure 4: Methodological Roadmap 
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Strategic planning — and the related decision-making effort — has also been described 
as ―assemblages of deliberations, with unpredictable triggers and fluid courses, evolving 
organically as the situation changes‖ (Pava 1983). More recently, planning has been also 
conceptualized as an emergent process, in which problem interpretations, deliberations, and 
actions unfold unpredictably (Markus et al. 2002). Such patterns of organizational activity are 
characterized by (1) an emergent process of deliberations with no best structure, (2) an actor set 
that is unpredictable in terms of job roles, and (3) intensive knowledge requirements and 
distributed expertise. A diverse set of actors (line managers, business planners, IS specialists) 
could thus initiate the process of strategic planning. Further, given the knowledge intensive 
nature of planning, decision makers are likely to work in collaboration with others in the 
organization. 
Planning is a knowledge-intensive emergent process requiring a high level of expert 
knowledge content, which often remains tacit. Knowledge requirements for strategic planning 
are difficult to capture and share. This difficulty inevitably means that, when tacit knowledge can 
be made explicit, it cannot easily be represented numerically, but must instead be represented as 
if-then rules (Baligh et al. 1996).  Planning for portfolios of IT initiatives often necessitates 
participation of a steering committee comprising a diverse set of stakeholders. Effective planning 
depends on a large spectrum of decision factors. Planning for large portfolios can often span 
several weeks at a time. The logics employed in planning effectively continue to be tacit
8
 given 
that the contextual knowledge utilized for decision making is often embedded idiosyncratically 
in organizational interactions and practices.  
                                                 
8
 Unobtrusive participation in several planning sessions within this organization and semi-
structured interviews with several key decision makers at this site validated my beliefs. 
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3.3.1 Stage One: Extracting Organizational Routines 
I chose a Fortune 50 organization as my research site. This organization, head-quartered in the 
United States, is in the manufacturing industry with over 35,000 employees, and annual revenues 
exceeding $18 billion dollars. Organizations in the manufacturing industry have often been 
chosen for studying decision making rationale in IT. See Oh and Pinsonneault (2007) as an 
exemplar. Central to the logic of appropriateness is the need to ascertain the identity of decision 
makers. Based on the analysis of the annual reports of this organization and after validating my 
evaluations with the senior executives in this organization, I classified this organization (and the 
decision makers in this organization) as Analyzers (Kabanoff and Brown 2008). I choose an 
Analyzer organization for my study for at least two reasons. First, Analyzers — given their 
tendency to rely on a large number of internal and external decision-making attributes — are 
expected to use relatively complex decision routines. Second, Analyzers are expected to follow a 
comprehensive planning effort. Choosing an Analyzer organization for my empirical study on 
routines and their evolution thus enriches the potential insights I can offer. Appendix A describes 
the process used to systematically ascertain the strategic orientation of the organization chosen 
for this study. I systematically examined the (tacit) decision-making processes used for 
prioritizing IT initiatives within this large Analyzer organization over two consecutive years. 
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Table 6: Two-Year Longitudinal Portfolio Data Summary 
Inputs to the decision process Outputs: 
Executive 
Decisions 
Benefits Associated  
With Initiatives  
Risk  Factors & Mitigation Mechanisms 
YEAR ONE: PORTFOLIO OF PROPOSED INITIATIVES (N = 57)  
Initiative Type 
OSS Benefits (79%)  
MIS Benefits (53%)  
IOS Benefits (49%) 
SDSS Benefits (32%) 
Process Improvements 
(82%) 
Structure (Low Structure = 32%, High Structure = 68%)  
Size (Low = 23%, Medium = 61%, High = 16%)  
Prior Experience (Low = 67%, Medium = 23%, High = 10%)   
BPR Accomplished (Yes = 16%), BPR Resources Committed (Yes = 23%) 
In-house Software Apps. (Yes = 8%), Specialized Software Apps. (Yes = 28%), 
Third Party Software Apps. (Yes = 22%), Internal Maturity (Low = 70%, 
Medium = 28%, High = 2%), External Capabilities (Yes = 56%) 
Reject (25%)  
Partially 
Fund 
Initiatives 
(30%)  
Fully Fund 
Initiatives 
(45%) 
YEAR TWO: PORTFOLIO OF PROPOSED INITIATIVES (N = 106)  
Initiative Type 
OSS Benefits (46%)  
MIS Benefits (19%)  
IOS Benefits (41%) 
SDSS Benefits (20%) 
Process Improvements 
(89%) 
Structure (Low Structure = 58%, High Structure = 42%)  
Size (Low = 60%, Medium = 27%, High = 13%)  
Prior Experience (Low = 20%, Medium = 33%, High = 47%)   
BPR Accomplished (Yes = 10%), BPR Resources Committed (Yes = 43%) 
In-house Software Apps. (Yes = 16%), Specialized Software Apps. (Yes = 
28%), Third Party Software Apps. (Yes = 25%), Internal Maturity (Low = 65%, 
Medium = 23%, High = 12%), External Capabilities (Yes = 58%) 
Reject (18%)  
Partially 
Fund 
Initiatives 
(25%)  
Fully Fund 
Initiatives 
(57%) 
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3.3.1.1 Portfolio Data  
  
I examined a set of 163 decisions for prioritizing proposals — each characterized by 15 decision-
making attributes — in a large IT portfolio within this large organization spanning two 
consecutive years. This rich set of attributes consumed during decision making is described in 
Section 2.3.1. 
 
Though initiatives in my data were proposed by individual managers, these initiatives are 
owned and governed by the senior leadership within the organization. Thus my data, in its 
aggregated form, represent an organization-level IT portfolio. Prioritization decisions on these 
portfolios were made by a steering committee comprising of senior IS (CIO, members of the CIO 
team) and business leadership (Vice President, other senior executives) during strategic IS 
planning sessions, in collaboration with the individual managers who proposed these initiatives. 
Prioritization decisions on each proposed initiative belonged to one of three classes: a proposed 
initiative (a) was rejected; (b) was approved with partial funding (c) was approved with full 
funding. Summary of the portfolio data used for analysis in this study is presented in Table 6.  
 
The size of the second year's portfolio is almost twice as big when compared to the first 
year's portfolio. A closer inspection of Table 6 reveals two findings. First, the second year's 
portfolio has a large number (60%) of low-sized (low-risk) initiatives as compared to the first 
year's portfolio which had a higher proportion (61%) of medium-sized (medium-risk) initiatives. 
Second, as compared to the first year, which had a higher proportion (68%) of (low-risk) high 
structured initiatives, the second year's portfolio had a higher proportion (58%) of (high-risk) 
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low structured initiatives. These observations reveal tradeoffs potentially involved in the 
definition of proposals for IT initiatives. 
 
3.3.1.2 Inductive Learning  
 
Strategic planning — a knowledge-intensive emergent process — requires a high level of 
expert knowledge, which often remains tacit (Langley et al. 1995, Markus et al. 2002). These 
knowledge requirements for planning are difficult to capture and share. This difficulty inevitably 
means that, when tacit knowledge can (and if at all) be made explicit, it cannot easily be 
represented numerically, but can instead be represented as if-then rules (Baligh et al. 1996). 
Decision makers can often articulate the rationale they used during strategic planning in the form 
of if-then rules. But this description is often limited to some decision making episodes or 
instances. Given that decision making during planning is accomplished as a group and driven by 
tacit knowledge —  knowledge which is embedded in the interactions between organizational 
members — it is often difficult for planners to describe the entire decision making process in 
terms of a cohesive set of rules. Articulating the nature in which these decision-making episodes 
interrelate and fit together to create the whole is also often difficult. Mechanisms in which these 
decision making episodes combine thus remain largely unknown. A holistic view of the entire 
decision making activity which could span several weeks, is thus difficult to articulate
9
.  
                                                 
9
 Challenges associated with research on formal planning revolve around choosing a dependent variable. 
The anticipated outcome ultimately associated with successful IT planning is improved organizational 
performance. Such outcomes are causally distant from the decision making rationale employed during the 
planning. Quality of the plans, as a dependent variable, developed has a more direct causal relationship 
(Byrd et al. 1995). Using quality of plans as the dependent variable seems to be appropriate. First, the 
quality of the plan produced at the end of planning served as a basis for resource allocation in this case. 
These plans are reviewed by several senior members (not involved in planning but) responsible for 
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Inductive learning methodology holistically discovers tacit knowledge contained in a 
decision process. Decision trees — outputs of the inductive learning — are approximations of 
this tacit decision making rationale (Quinlan 1990). Decision trees compactly describe the target 
concept —decisions driven by tacit knowledge — using a set of conjunctives (Quinlan 1986). 
Trees create an ordering among the decision attributes characterizing examples that belong to a 
particular decision and the ones that do not. Trees represent knowledge in a form that can be 
easily understood by humans. My methodological approach enables me to codify tacit decision-
making knowledge. This conversion from tacit knowledge or rationale to explicit decision rules 
has strong implications for the discovery and effective management of knowledge within 
organizations (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). 
  
Inductive learning is driven by classification algorithms (Quinlan 1986). But, the essence 
of inductive learning is conceptual rather than computational. Induction progressively discovers 
the underlying structure of the data by partitioning it along key informative decision attributes. 
These decision attributes that guide the partition of the data are chosen such that they provide the 
most information about the final decision. The most informative decision attribute is chosen first 
and represents the top most attribute in the decision tree. These steps progressively collect sub-
groups within the data set which were all similar with regards to the final decision. At the end of 
this iterative mining effort that is grounded in data, we arrive at a decision tree where all the data 
                                                                                                                                                             
governance of initiatives within this organization. There is a strong causal link between the quality of 
plans produced and the funding awarded to proposals; better plans get better funding. Investigation on 
how plans actually affect an organization’s performance would require a separate study of the 
implementation process itself. In such a study, the quality of the plan is an independent variable, with 
organizational performance as a dependent variable. Even with that research focus, a measure of plan 
quality would be necessary. I presented the induced models to the key decision makers. They validated 
the appropriateness of these decision trees and suggested that they effectively represent the rationale 
applied to develop appropriate plans. They were very happy to see compact models that resembled the 
inherent complexity of the underlying decision making process.  
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instances on the leaf — a point at which the decision tree cannot be ―grown‖ anymore — are 
similar with regards to the final decision. In the process, decision tree give us decision paths — 
comprising of decision making attributes — to ―arrive‖ at these decisions. Decision paths can be 
discovered by tracing the tree from its root node —  the top most classification attribute of the 
tree — to each leaf. Figure 5 and 6 represent sample decision trees induced from my data set. 
Figure 5 a decision tree induced on the first year’s portfolio data set yields 16 individual decision 
rules. Figure 6 a decision tree induced on the second year’s data yields 12 decision rules. 
 
Decision making during strategic planning can have multiple narratives or alternative 
rationales. Decision trees are thus approximations that represent the informational interactions 
and emergent knowledge exchanges between planners and can be effective for developing 
holistic decision making narratives. Given this structured, comprehensive approach to 
discovering and representing the underlying structure of the data, decision trees possess high 
descriptive validity (Tessmer et al. 1993). Individual paths or rules in decision trees 
systematically highlight a collection of attributes used during decision-making. The length of 
these paths effectively represents the complexity of the underlying decision process. Number of 
examples classified on a particular decision path serves as a proxy for the strength of decision 
themes (the frequency of decision rule or routine usage) and guides the discovery of decision-
making routines. To comprehensively discover these alternative decision making rationales and 
to faithfully represent the inherent alternative decision themes, inductive learning methodology is 
often applied on separate, randomly drawn sub samples of the data. For instance, in this case, a 
randomly drawn sample of 80% of the portfolio was used for training (the process of discovering 
the decision making rationale) and the prediction accuracy of the induced model (a measure of 
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how faithfully this discovered decision rationale generalizes to the entire set of decisions) was 
tested on a disjoint randomly drawn sample of 20% of the total portfolio. Every random sample 
was selected such that all classes of decisions were represented; ensuring purity of induced trees.  
Trees were randomized 20 times at this stage to generate alternative induced decision 
models. A typical decision model followed a familiar pattern: About 80% instances were 
classified or explained by about 20% of the decision rules. Thus it would be accurate to infer that 
a large majority of the decisions are based on application of a small set of tacit routines, and a 
relatively small fraction of the decisions could be described as exceptions to the rules. Each 
induced model serves as a credible approximation of the underlying decision process. Prediction 
accuracy of a decision model represents this credibility measure. To further improve the validity 
of the findings, the same analysis was conducted using a 90%—10% training/testing sample split 
and a 70%—30% training/testing sample split. Inducing models at a different training-testing 
sample split ensured high consistency and the discovery of unique routines. After inducing about 
sixty different decision models at three training-testing sample splits, the discovery of routines 
converged. No new routines could be extracted. The process of discovering new routines 
converged after about sixty iterations. 
 
Discovery of organizational ―habits‖ depended on two criteria used for retaining only 
―true‖ routines from the plethora of rules discovered from decision trees. First, rules were 
retained only if the prediction precision of the decision models was sufficiently high. I retained 
rules from models with a prediction precision of 55% or higher. Decisions on proposals belong 
to three classes — proposals were: (1) rejected; (2) partially approved; or (3) fully approved and 
funded. Without induced decision models, the probability with which one can predict a decision 
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is 33%. I choose models induced on the portfolio data that significantly improve these odds.  A 
lower bound of 55%, improves these odds by at least two-thirds.  
One more criterion was considered: the frequency with which the decision rule was 
applied. A decision rule applied to make just one decision out of a total of 100 decisions 
typically does not symbolize a routine. It is the frequency with which a rule is applied that makes 
it an organizational ―habit‖. I only retained rules that were applied in at least 10% of the total 
decisions. This mechanism of choosing only rules that classified at least 10% of the total 
decisions served as an effective pruning mechanism. Steps were also taken to eliminate 
duplicates. I obtained two sets of routines; each faithfully representing decision making rationale 
used in planning. The first year’s decision making was represented by a set of 31 unique 
routines. Similarly, the second year’s decision making was represented by a set of 38 unique 
routines. Descriptive data on these sets of routines are presented in Table 7.  
Sub-portfolios that included some proposals for initiatives of low structure were 
considered as tasks with higher causal ambiguity. Proposals with low structure are different from 
proposals with high structure. Higher causal ambiguity pertaining to low-structured tasks inhibits 
the easy adoption of routines pertaining to organizational decisions on such sub-portfolios.
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Figure 5: A Sample Decision Tree (Year One) 
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Figure 6: A Sample Decision Tree (Year Two) 
 
Initiative Size?
BPR 
Accomplished?
R: Proposed Initiative Rejected
PF: Proposed Initiative Partially Approved and Funded
FF: Proposed Initiative Fully Approved and Funded
N = Number of classifications on the decision rule
High
OSS 
Benefits?
BPR 
Accomplished?
Process 
Benefits?
PF
N=1
Low
Medium
Yes No
No
Yes No
Yes
Initiative 
Structure?
R
N=1
FF
N=7
Prior 
Experience?
FF
N=4
IOS Benefits?
R
N=2
FF
N=3
No Yes
Yes No
High 
Structure
Low 
Structure
Low Medium
Legend: 
OSS : Operations Support Systems 
SDSS Initiative: Strategic Decision Support 
Systems 
MIS Initiative: Marketing Information Systems 
IOS Initiative: Inter-Organizational Systems 
BPR: Business Process Reengineering
Risk 
Attribute
Benefit 
Attribute
Planning  Decision
Main Path
FF
N=2
FF
N=1
PF
N=2
FF
N=1
SDSS 
Benefits?
No
Initiative 
Structure?
High 
Structure
Low 
Structure
PF
N=5
FF
N=2
Yes
SCENARIO A
An Appropriate 
Rule
 
  64 
 
Table 7: Sets of Routines 
 Year One Year Two 
Is the Routine Appropriate? Inappropriate (8), Appropriate (23) Inappropriate (9), Appropriate (29) 
Complexity of the Routine (measured in 
terms of the numbers of contingencies in 
the routine definition) 
2 Contingencies (5), 3 Contingencies (7),  
4 Contingencies (11), 5 Contingencies (5),  
6 Contingencies (5), 7 Contingencies (3),  
8 Contingencies (1), 9 Contingencies (1) 
2 Contingencies (2), 3 Contingencies (5),  
4 Contingencies (7), 5 Contingencies (11),  
6 Contingencies (3), 7 Contingencies (1),  
8 Contingencies (1), 9 Contingencies (1) 
Frequency of Routine Usage (measured 
in terms of the proportion of decisions 
explained by the routine) 
10% (17), 13% (9),  
15% (1), 18% (3), 23% (1) 
10% (13), 11% (8), 12% (5), 15% (4), 16% 
(3), 17% (3), 18% (2) 
Task Causal Ambiguity (considered high 
if the sub portfolio contained some 
proposals with low structure) 
Low Ambiguity (7), High Ambiguity (24) Low Ambiguity (3), High Ambiguity (33) 
Kind of Decision Rejection (7),  
Partial Funding (9), Fully Funding (15) 
Rejection (1),  
Partial Funding (4), Fully Funding (33) 
Total # of Routines 31 38 
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3.3.1.3. Operationalization of Appropriateness 
Appropriate behavior requires planners with Analyzer-like identities to arrive at approval 
decisions on high-risk initiatives only after devising mitigation mechanisms to control risk. 
Planners with Analyzer-like identities who approve high-risk initiatives without devising 
mechanisms to control risk are behaving inappropriately (March and Shapira 1987). Rules for 
approving high-risk initiatives that show evidence of the presence of risk mitigation mechanisms 
are defined to be appropriate (for risk-averse Analyzers).  Figure 5 and 6 are examples of trees 
induced on my data set. The rule schemata (i.e. the abstract representation of a rule; e.g. Feldman 
and Pentland 2003) extracted from decision trees guides my operationalization of 
appropriateness. Consider the following rule extracted from Figure 5.  
 
If (Size= “Low”) & (OSS Benefits = “Yes”) & (IOS Benefits = “Yes”) & (Structure = “Low”) 
& (Prior Experience = “High”)  Fully Fund Initiative 
 
This rule was coded as an appropriate rule as it shows evidence that high risk factors 
[fluid, low structured initiatives (McFarlan 1981)] were mitigated [(1) size of initiatives was low, 
(2) prior experience associated with technology was high] before approving such initiatives. 
Consider another rule extracted from Figure 5. 
 
If (Size= “High”) & (BPR Accomplished = “Yes”)  Partially Fund Initiative 
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This rule was coded as being appropriate as it shows evidence that the risk factors [high 
size of the initiative (McFarlan 1981)] were mitigated (business process redesign tasks associated 
with such large proposals were completed) before partially approving such initiatives. Consider 
the following rejection rule extracted from Figure 6.  
 
If (Size=“Low”) & (SDSS-Benefits=“No”) & (IOS-Benefits=“Yes”) & (Structure=“Low”) & 
(Prior Experience=“Low”) & (BPR Accomplished =“Yes”)  Reject Initiative 
 
This rejection rule was coded appropriate as it does not show evidence that high risk factors 
[fluid, low structured initiatives (McFarlan 1981)] were mitigated (size of such initiatives was 
low, but prior experience associated with the technology was low and business process redesign 
tasks associated with these initiatives were not completed).  Such initiatives were appropriately 
rejected. Rules of the following two abstract forms or schemata (Feldman and Pentland 2003), 
were operationalized as being appropriate: 
 
1. If (Risk = “High/Medium”) & (Mitigation Mechanisms = “No”)  Reject Initiative   
2. If (Risk=“High/Medium”) & (Mitigation Mechanisms = “Yes”)  (Partially or Fully) 
Approve Initiative  
 
Table 7 revealed two findings. First, the proportion of appropriate routines in year one 
was 74% and the proportion of appropriate routines in year two was 76%. This slight 
improvement in the proportion of appropriate routines in the second year is notably relevant 
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given that the size of the second year's decision space was almost twice as large as the first year's 
decision space. Second, the proportion of rejection routines used in the second year is also lower 
when compared to rejection routines used in the first year. This finding provides explicit 
evidence of the tacit learning that is occurring where managers are self-correcting their proposals 
in the second year. 
 
3.3.2 Stage Two: Evolutionary Outcomes 
 
Routine schemata and their applicative forms (Feldman and Pentland 2003) helped me 
determine the routines that were essentially the same, ones that were modified, ones that were 
added new and others that were discontinued from usage. Routines in their abstract form which 
were discontinued from usage — present in the first year’s set of routines and absent from the 
second year’s set of routines — were considered as routines that were truly discontinued from 
usage. Abstract representation of all routines in both sets of routines was compared to 
consistently make this determination. This determination was conducted by multiple raters. The 
inter-rater reliability across all four evolutionary outcomes was greater than 90%. 
 
I identify 12 routines that were discontinued from usage from the first year’s set of 
routines as they did not appear in the second year’s set. Similarly, routines in their abstract form 
that appeared only in the second year’s set of routines and were not present in the first year’s set 
were deemed as being new routines. I identify 14 routines as being new since they (in their 
abstract form) were present only in the second year’s set of routines.   
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Routines that were identical in their schemata or abstract form in both sets of routines 
were identified as ones that were retained as-is. Though these routines differed in their 
application, they were essentially the same abstract routines being reapplied. I identify 11 
routines that were retained as-is across both the sets of routines spanning two years. After 
inspecting the instantiated routines, systematic changes to the abstract form or the schemata of a 
routine helped me detect routines that were truly adapted. I identify 8 routines from the first 
year’s set of routines that were modified to create 13 routines in the second year’s set of routines.   
 
Thus the total set of outcomes of the evolutionary process comprised of 45 cases (12 
routines that were deleted, 14 that were added new, 8 routines that were modified or adapted, and 
11 routines that were retained as-as across the two years). Table 8 gives examples of routines 
across two years — in their abstract and instantiated forms — and the corresponding 
evolutionary outcomes. Table 9 presents a summary of the routine data set including 45 
evolutionary scenarios used for discovering the structure of the underlying, unknown 
evolutionary process.  
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Table 8: Determination of Evolutionary Outcomes 
Routines (Year One) Routines (Year Two) Outcomes 
Abstract 
Form 
Instantiated Form Abstract 
Form 
Instantiated Form  
No routine in year one considered all three risk factors. This 
routine (abstract representation) was present only in the second 
year’s routine set. 
RRR  FF If (Size = ―Medium‖) &  
(Structure = ―High‖) &  
(Prior Experience = ―High‖)  FF 
Added  
New 
No routine in year one used a combination of a risk attribute and 
mitigation mechanism to arrive at a partial funding decision. This 
routine (abstract representation) was present only in the second 
year’s set. 
RM  PF If (Structure = ―High‖) & 
(Third Party Software Apps. = ―Yes‖) PF 
Added  
New 
BMFF If (Strategic Benefits = ―Yes‖) &  
(Specialized Software Apps. = ―Yes‖)  FF 
BMFF If (Process Improvements = ―Yes‖) &  
( BPR Accomplished = ―Yes‖)  FF 
Retain  
As-Is 
BRM  
FF 
If (Process Improvements = ―Yes‖) &  
(Structure = ―Low‖) &  
(External Capabilities = ―Yes‖)  FF 
BRM FF If (Process Improvements = ―Yes‖) & (Size 
= ―Medium‖)   
& (Internal Maturity = ―Medium‖)  FF 
Retain  
As-Is 
BM FF If (Marketing Benefits = ―Yes‖) &  
(External Capabilities = ―Yes‖)  FF 
BBMFF If (Marketing Benefits = ―Yes‖) & 
(Strategic Benefits = ―Yes‖) &  
(External Capabilities = ―Yes‖)  FF 
Modified 
RMM 
FF 
If (Size = ―Medium‖) & 
(In-house Software Apps = ―Yes‖) & 
(BPR Resources Committed = ―Yes‖)  FF 
RRM PF If (Size = ―Medium‖) & 
(Structure = ―High‖) &  
(In-house Software Apps = ―Yes‖)  PF 
Modified 
BR  FF If (Strategic Benefits =  ―Yes‖) &  
(Size = ―Medium‖)  FF 
This routine (abstract representation) was not present in the 
second year’s routine set.  
Deleted 
BMM  R If (Strategic Benefits = ―Yes‖) &  
(Third Party Software Apps.= ―No‖) &  
(Specialized Software Apps.= ―No‖) R 
This routine (abstract representation) was not present in the 
second year’s routine set.  
Deleted 
B = Attributes characterizing potential benefits associated with initiatives  
R = Attributes characterizing risks associated with initiatives 
M = Attributes characterizing risk mitigation mechanisms associated with initiatives 
Managerial Decisions: 
R = Reject Initiative, PF = Approve and Partially Fund Initiative, FF = Approve and Fully Fund Initiative 
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Table 9: Evolutionary Outcomes 
 Combined Routine Evolutionary Dataset 
Is the Routine Appropriate? Inappropriate (14), Appropriate (31) 
Complexity of the Routine Low Complexity (Less than 5 contingencies) (19),  
High Complexity (Greater than or equal to 5 
contingencies) (26) 
Frequency of Routine Usage Low Frequency (Less than or equal to 15%) (26),  
High Frequency (Greater than or equal to 15%) (19) 
Task Causal Ambiguity Low Ambiguity (11), High Ambiguity (34) 
Kind of Decision Rejection (10), Partial Funding (15), Fully Funding (20) 
Outcomes of the Evolutionary 
Process 
Routine Added (14), Routine Deleted (12) 
Routine Retained As-Is (11), Routine Modified (8) 
Total # of Evolutionary Scenarios 45 
 
 
3.3.3 Stage Three: The Evolutionary Process 
To study patterns of evolution, I relied on an inductive methodology. This methodology reveals 
meta-routines explaining the evolution of routines. For comprehensively studying reliable 
patterns in this evolution, multiple models were induced on the routine data set which included 
45 instances. These multiple models were induced on this routine data set in order to verify high 
consistency and structural reliability of the evolutionary process. A randomly drawn sample of 
80% of the total data set was used for training where as another randomly drawn sample of 20% 
of the total data set was used for testing the prediction accuracy of the induced model. Similar 
analysis was conducted at the 90% — 10% sample split. Fifteen evolutionary models were 
induced at each stage. I induced more models at each stage. I induced evolutionary models at the 
70%-30% sample split. Given the high consistency of the models, I present results based on 30 
models. Of the 30 decision models induced, 28 models had ―Is the Routine Appropriate?” as the 
top classification attribute. The best representative model chosen represents a very consistent, 
evolutionary process.  
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The evolutionary process had 4 outcomes: Routines were (1) added, (2) deleted, (3) retained as 
is, or (4) modified. Probability of predicting an evolutionary outcome in the absence of an 
evolutionary model is 25%. The best representative model I chose has a prediction accuracy of 
50%. I have thus improved the odds of predicting the proper evolutionary outcome by 100%.   
Figure 7 reveals the structure of this meta-routine, which compactly represents the tacit, yet 
stable, evolutionary process. My findings have implications for empirical research on routines 
and dynamic capabilities. 
 
3.4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
H1 dealt with understanding the characteristics of routines that facilitate their addition to an 
existing repertoire of routines. The thirty evolutionary models induced on the routine data set 
(obtained at the end of Stage two) resulted in a total of 63 rules pertaining to the addition of new 
routines. Of these 63 rules, 25 rules represented strong evolutionary patterns [instances classified 
on those evolutionary paths > = 6 (approximately 15% of the total routine data set)]. When an 
evolutionary path classifies about 10-15% of total instances; it signifies that this rule represents a 
true evolutionary pattern and not just a spurious case of change (Zollo and Winter 2002). Strong 
evolutionary patterns indicate systematic support for my hypotheses. 
Of these 25 paths, 9 paths were in support of H1 [were of the form If (Is the Routine 
Appropriate? = “Yes”) & (Frequency of Routine Usage? = “Low”)  Add Routine]. None of 
the evolutionary paths discovered were of the form If (Is the Routine Appropriate? = “Yes”) & 
(Frequency of Routine Usage? = “High”)  Add Routine. My findings corroborate H1 (36% of 
the evolutionary paths validated H1) and this support is presented in Figure 7.  
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I find another path in Figure 7 that explains the generation of new routines. Tasks of high 
causal ambiguity are difficult to plan for. New routines added were of low complexity, and 
pertained to tasks of low causal ambiguity (Zollo and Winter 2002) thus facilitating their easy 
adoption in the second year’s set of routines. Low causal ambiguity associated with these newly 
planned tasks in conjunction with the low complexity of the new routine used for decide upon 
such new initiatives facilitates easy socialization of these new rules. Routines that are easy to 
socialize are likely to gain adopters more easily when compared to routines that cannot be easily 
communicated (e.g. routines that are complex or pertain to tasks of high causal ambiguity). 
The path in Figure 7 validating H1 classified 8 scenarios of the total 45 evolutionary 
scenarios. This finding suggests that change is likely to proceed in gradual steps and extreme 
changes to the status quo are less likely to be implemented successfully given the foundation for 
stability created by routines. 
Figure 7: Meta Routines Explaining the Evolution of Routines 
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H2 dealt with understanding characteristics of routines themselves that are likely to 
explain which routines are expected to be discontinued from usage. The thirty evolutionary 
models resulted in a total of 32 rules explaining the deletion of old routines. Of these 32 rules, 22 
rules represented strong evolutionary patterns (instances classified on those evolutionary paths > 
= 6). Of these 22 evolutionary paths, 14 paths were in support of H2 [were of the form If (Is the 
Routine Appropriate? = “No”) & (Frequency of Routine Usage = “Low”)  Delete Old 
Routine]. My findings corroborate H2 (63% of the evolutionary paths discovered validated H2) 
and this support is presented in Figure 7. The path in Figure 7 validating H2 classified 10 
scenarios. This finding suggests that unlearning ―bad‖ habits is difficult and is likely to proceed 
in small steps. 
H3 maintained that appropriate, simple routines that are frequently used are likely to be 
retained for future use. The thirty evolutionary models resulted in a total of 68 rules explaining 
the retention of old routines. Of these 68 rules, 38 paths represented strong evolutionary patterns 
(instances classified on those evolutionary paths >= 6). My findings could support this 
hypothesis in its entirety [the evolutionary paths discovered were not of the form If (Is the 
Routine Appropriate? = “Yes”) & (Frequency of Routine Usage = “High”) & (Routine 
Complexity = “Low”)  Retain Old Routine], but my findings provide partial support for H3 
[i.e. evolutionary paths discovered were of the form: If (Is the Routine Appropriate? = “Yes”) & 
(Routine Complexity = “Low”)  Retain Old Routine]. Of the total 38 strong evolutionary paths 
discovered, 20 paths were in partial support of H3. My findings partially corroborate H3 (52% of 
the evolutionary paths discovered partially validated H3).  
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This support is presented in Figure 7. The path in Figure 7 validating H3 classified 8 
scenarios. This finding suggests that simple, appropriate routines are likely to be retained as-is 
for future use and the almost automatic response they offer simplifies organizational action. 
H4 maintained that along with appropriate routines; inappropriate routines that are 
frequently applied are also likely to be retained. Thirty evolutionary models induced offered a 
total of 68 rules leading to the retention of old routines. Of these 68 rules, 38 rules represented 
strong evolutionary patterns (instances classified on those evolutionary paths >= 6). Of these 38 
paths, 16 paths were in support of H4 [i.e. were of the form: If (Is the Routine Appropriate? = 
“No”) & (Frequency of Routine Usage = “High”)  Retain Old Routine].  
My findings corroborate H4 (42% of the evolutionary paths discovered validated H4) and 
this support is presented in Figure 7. The path in Figure 7 validating H4 classified 8 scenarios. 
This finding reveals the dark side of organizational inertia which assists in the retention of ―bad‖ 
habits. 
H5 dealt with understanding the characteristics of routines that guide their adaptation. 
Thirty evolutionary models induced resulted in a total of 34 rules explaining the adaptation of 
existing routines. Of these 34 evolutionary rules, 17 represented strong evolutionary patterns 
(instances classified on those evolutionary paths > = 6) explaining the adaptation of routines. Of 
these 17 paths, 12 paths validated H5 [were of the form If (Is the Routine Appropriate? = “Yes”) 
& (Routine Complexity? = “High”)  Adapt or Modify Old Routine]. My findings corroborate 
H5 (over 70% of the evolutionary paths discovered validated H5) and this support for H5 is 
presented in Figure 7. The path in Figure 7 supporting H5 classified 4 scenarios of the total 45 
evolutionary scenarios. This finding suggests that complex, appropriate routines are less likely to 
be reused as-is and are more likely to be modified before future use (March and Simon 1958). 
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Given that I defined a routine based on a lower bound on the rule strength set at 10% of 
instances classified on a rule from the entire population of the decision space, sensitivity analysis 
was further conducted to improve the consistency of the reported findings. In this sensitivity 
check, we increased the lower bound on the definition of a routine to a minimum requirement of 
a rule that classified at least 15% instances from the entire population within the decision space. 
This sensitivity check reduced our set of evolutionary outcomes from the earlier set of 45 
scenarios to a total of fifteen scenarios. Inductive methods were used to analyze the 
characteristics of routines that endogenously explained the evolutionary mechanisms underlying 
these fifteen scenarios. This sensitivity analysis yielded the following two sets of insights. 
First, the anatomy of the dynamic capability (as reported prior to conducting this 
sensitivity check) continues to be structurally reliable. ―Appropriateness of the routine‖ 
continues to be the top most classification criterion guiding the evolution of routines over time.  
Second, presented below is the partial support for the hypotheses developed in my work. 
Given that the sensitivity check reduced my routine dataset to fifteen scenarios, H1 could not be 
tested in this new setting. My analysis yielded partial support for H2. Routines that were 
inappropriate and that were applied with a low frequency were discontinued from usage over 
time. This finding seemed contrary to my expectations as I found evidence to suggest that 
appropriate routines were being discontinued from usage over time. But a closer investigation 
revealed that the routines that were being discontinued were rejection routines. This finding 
provides explicit evidence to suggest the learning that has occurred over time where proposals 
presented in the second year were being self corrected based on the first year’s rejection 
decisions. Results also indicate partial support for H3 where appropriate routines were retained 
for future use. These routines were applied with a low frequency suggesting that certain habits 
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were retained over time in spite of them not being ―strong‖ habits. H4, which empirically tests 
the dark of inertia, i.e. the retention of ―bad‖ habits, was also validated. Findings suggest that 
some inappropriate routines, i.e. routines that do not adhere to some criterion of appropriateness 
intrinsic to the identity of the decision makers in a given decision making situation, are likely to 
be retained for future use. Finally, findings also provide partial support for H5.Appropirate 
routines applied with a high frequency, were modified before future use. Given this analysis 
conducted as a different threshold (pertaining to the definition of organizational routines) 
provides partial support for four of the five hypotheses discussed in my work. This sensitivity 
check potentially improves the robustness of my findings. 
 
The organization chosen for this study enabled me to examine the evolution of routines in 
a naturally controlled setting. My explanation for the evolution of routines is based largely on the 
endogenous characteristics of routines themselves. My setting was naturally controlled along at 
least four dimensions.  
 
First, over the two year period, there were no substantial change in terms of the 
organizational size (e.g. number of employees) or the revenues generated by this organization 
and its market capitalization. The stock price of this organization did not change significantly 
over this two year period. A change in organizational size was a key covariate explaining 
(written) rule changes (March et al. 2000).  
 
Second, the senior leadership responsible for portfolio management did not change over 
the two year period. The decision makers responsible for planning: Chief Information Officer, 
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Chief Executive Officer, the Vice President, and other senior IT staff and business leadership 
were the same. Changes in senior leadership can be an exogenous factor in triggering changes in 
routines (Vaast and Levina 2006).  
 
Third, there were no substantial regulatory changes in the external environment. This 
study was conducted over the two year period from 2005-06. Thus, this study was conducted 
well after year 2000 (e.g. an event like Y2K during the course of the investigation would have 
been a substantial external force influencing change). This study was also conducted well after 
another recent substantial event, the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Regulatory 
changes in the external environment (e.g. the passage of a federal regulation) were covariates 
explaining rule changes (March et al. 2000). The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley regulation led to 
the creation of a compliance portfolio. After the initial spike, expenses in this portfolio 
stabilized.  
 
Fourth, this corporation was organized such that portfolios were planned in the US and 
were implemented at an off-site location. The same off-site location was responsible for 
implementing these plans over the two year period. This outsourcing strategy (Garud et al. 2006) 
remained stable for a year before and after the two year period over which this study was 
conducted. My controlled setting thus helps me eliminate several alternative explanations and 
potentially significant external events guiding changes in routines and lends credibility to my 
findings. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
4.1. LIMITATIONS 
Every research endeavor suffers from some limitations. Data analyzed in this dissertation 
— for both the research studies — were gathered from one large organization. This could imply 
that my research suffers from limited generalizability. Given that the business units I have 
chosen for my analysis are pursuing identifiable strategic orientations from the well accepted 
generic Defender-Prospector-Analyzer typology (Miles and Snow 1978), I suggest that the 
decision making insights I generate are applicable to a large majority of organizations that can be 
classified using this typology. This limitation in the research design, however, does offer some 
advantages; it enables me to systematically test differences in decision making across three 
business units pursuing different strategic orientations within a controlled setting. This naturally 
controlled environment helps me account for other confounding factors (such as differences in 
decision making due to individual differences in personal leadership styles across organizations, 
etc) and attribute differences in decision making to the differences in the strategic orientations of 
the individual businesses.  
In the evolutionary study, I examined a set of 163 decisions based on fifteen decision 
attributes, within this large organization spanning two consecutive years which yielded 69 
organizational routines. Based on a systematic comparison of routines used over time, I was able 
to isolate 45 systematic evolutionary scenarios. This focus on one rich organizational setting and 
this context specificity helps me generate rich insights. Definitions of proposals for IT initiatives 
are specific to an organizational context and are often idiosyncratic to each organization. Actions 
of decision makers are likely to be intricately embedded in an idiosyncratic, organizational 
context (March et al. 1991, Orlikowski 1996, Vaast and Levina 2006). I propose a process for the 
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evolution of routines along two paths — (1) a mechanism that challenges the status quo, (2) a 
mechanism that adopts or adapts the status quo. Though my data were obtained from one 
organization, the process of organizational learning proposed here is potentially generalizable 
and hopefully will stimulate future research in this stream. 
 
4.2. IMPLICATIONS FOR IT PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 
My research has three key managerial implications. First, articulating tacit decision 
making knowledge and representing this rationale as decision trees can offer managers several 
advantages. Trees cluster decision-making attributes and managerial decisions along distinct 
decision paths or rules giving me gestalts that holistically explain organizational actions (Miller 
1981, Quinlan 1986). Decision trees can equip boundedly rational planners with rules from the 
past which can expedite future decision making and potentially alleviate the planning paradox 
(Simon 1955, Lederer and Sethi 1988). Repositories of decision rules can be communicated to a 
diverse group of stakeholders for facilitating consensus building (Tsoukas 1996, Eisenhardt and 
Sull 2001, Heugens et al. 2004). Ensuring that key checks and balances are in place before 
approving initiatives is critical from a governance perspective. Well-defined rules can provide 
managers with the right incentives; i.e. encourage rule following and discouraging rule-defiant 
behavior in the future (for e.g., Prendergast 1999). In other words, managers can refine their 
future proposals to ensure that they meet the ―hurdles‖ set by planners. 
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Figure 8: Best Representative Defender Decision Model 
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Second, decision trees can give planners an ex-ante indication of the extent of their risk-
taking and help them better manage these risks during plan implementation. A diverse group of 
stakeholders now need to ensure rationale that is in alignment with organizational objectives is 
applied when deciding upon IT portfolios. Defenders are risk averse and need to ensure risks are 
being managed early on during planning. Presented in Figure 8 is the best representative decision 
model for the Defender chosen from the 60 alternative models based on its (a) high structural 
stability and (b) high prediction accuracy. In this compact decision model, I find strong decision-
making themes given that majority (over 60%) of decisions on the proposed initiatives were 
  81 
made using just one decision rule. These approvals were made if proposed initiatives had the 
potential to improve efficiency of the business processes of the Defender.  
 
Figure 9: Best Representative Prospector Decision Model 
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I find that a large number of proposed initiatives were approved only after ascertaining 
that the internal maturity of these initiatives was not low. This reliance on a risk mitigation factor 
(medium or high internal maturity of proposed initiatives) during decision-making (Lambert 
1986) provides validation for aligned Defender behavior which deemphasizes risk-taking.  
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Additionally, of all the attributes consumed in the decision-making, only one attribute 
pertains to the nature of benefits offered by the proposed initiatives. This low proportion of 
benefit attributes suggests that decision-making in the Defender is geared towards understanding 
and mitigating risks associated with proposed initiatives. The Analyzer’s best representative 
decision model, presented in Figure 10 reveals similar findings. Given the dual goals associated 
with Analyzer behavior, the Analyzer model is significantly more complex when compared to 
the Defender decision model. The risk-averse nature of both these kinds of organizations 
manifests itself in decision models which consume a greater proportion of risk and risk 
mitigation attributes when compared to benefit related attributes. 
Third, decision trees help managers approach alignment using a unique perspective and 
ensuring the right mix of initiatives is approved; potentially enhancing the likelihood of success 
(Chan and Reich 2007). Prospectors have higher risk taking tendencies and are more likely to 
encourage flexibility by encouraging IT initiatives that enable them to tap into emerging markets. 
The best representative decision model for the Prospector is presented in Figure 9.  
The decision model reveals that the Prospector consumes a larger proportion of decision 
attributes which describe the potential benefits of proposed initiatives. A Prospector’s low 
emphasis on efficiency improvements is also demonstrated by the fact that this attribute is 
considered last. A higher proportion of benefit related attributes in the decision model is aligned 
with exploratory Prospector behavior. This decision model also is in alignment with the higher 
risk taking tendencies of the Prospectors as very few risk mitigation factors are considered before 
approving proposed initiatives. Inter-organizational systems are rejected because the creation of 
strong electronic links between suppliers and customers can be perceived as being restrictive by 
the Prospector who values flexibility (Das et al. 1991). 
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Figure 10: Best Representative Analyzer Decision Model 
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Decision trees presented in my research can help managers simultaneously understand (1) 
the risk posture embedded in their portfolios (Boynton and Zmud 1987), validate if this posture 
is in alignment with their risk appetite (McFarlan 1981) and (2) ensure strategic alignment by 
validating a right mix of initiatives is being approved (Sabherwal and Chan 2001).  
Table 10: Decision Trees and Implications for Alignment 
 Main Decision Making Theme or 
Decision Rule 
Implications for Alignment 
  Strategic Alignment  Alignment with Risk 
Appetite 
Defender If (Initiative Benefits = “Process 
Improvements”) && (Internal 
Maturity = “Medium”)  
Approve Initiative 
A large proportion of 
initiatives are 
approved after 
ascertaining that they 
have the potential to 
offer business process 
efficiency 
improvements. 
The risk averse 
Defender mitigates 
risks associated with 
initiatives by 
ascertaining that 
requirements 
associated with these 
proposals are well 
defined. 
Prospector If (Initiative Benefits = “IOS 
systems benefits”)  Reject 
Initiative 
 
If (Initiative Benefits = 
“Marketing systems benefits”)  
Approve Initiative 
IOS initiatives set up 
restrictive electronic 
links with suppliers 
and customers; 
limiting flexibility 
which is valued by the 
Prospector. Initiatives 
that enable them to 
tap into new markets 
are readily approved. 
Prospectors have a 
high risk appetite. 
Their decision making 
tends to be tentative. 
Decision rules are 
very short depicting 
tentative decision 
making process. The 
Prospector decision 
model does not reflect 
many risk mitigation 
concerns. 
Analyzer If (Initiative Size = “Medium”) 
&& (Internal Maturity = “Low”) 
&& (Initiative Structure = 
“High”)  Approve Initiative 
Analyzers have a 
preference for all 
types of initiatives: 
Analyzer does not 
have strong 
preference for only 
certain kinds of 
initiatives. 
Risk averse Analyzer 
mitigates risks 
associated with low 
maturity, proposals by 
ensuring objectives of 
these proposals are 
well defined. 
The Prospector decision model reveals the presence of themes that are weaker when compared to 
the Defender corroborating the tentative nature of the decision process. The Analyzer decision 
model revealed even weaker decision themes corroborating that the planning process with 
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organizations pursuing this kind of strategic orientation lacks strong unifying decision themes. 
Key research findings from the decision trees are summarized in Table 10. 
Evolutionary mechanisms I propose have substantial implications for improving the 
maturity of the portfolio management (Maizlish and Handler 2005) within organizations. IT 
portfolio management and the related prioritization of large numbers of proposals for initiatives 
is an important organizational activity requiring participation of diverse sets of executives. This 
decision problem can be managed efficiently by employing a repertoire of routines. Within 
organizations that continually learn, this set of routines is expected to evolve to a more effective 
set along evolutionary paths proposed in my research.  
Interestingly enough, based on the analysis of evolutionary outcomes, in some instances I 
found that some appropriate routines were being dropped. This observation at first was puzzling; 
but a closer examination revealed further insights. These routines that were being dropped were 
appropriate routines employed for rejecting proposals. Dropping appropriate rejection routines 
was actually evidence to suggest that managers proposing initiatives were not repeating their 
mistakes. Managers were self-correcting their proposals. Based on the rejections that were being 
given out to proposals with certain traits; managers in the second year, were not developing 
proposals of similar traits. Managers were reducing the size of the decision problem by this self 
correction. Such improvements expedite planning. Such explicit evidence for a tacit pattern of 
learning has implications for improving the maturity of IT portfolio management.  
A repertoire of routines provides a systematic mechanism for screening proposals. 
Applying routines consistently would improve the quality of the planning effort and help 
organizations systematically manage their risk exposure. A consistent set of routines would help 
organizations achieve a "managed" (Jeffery and Leliveld 2004) portfolio management process. 
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Frequent reviews of the routines applied would be necessary to continually improve the efficacy 
of planning. Incrementally improving the repertoire of routines by adopting the evolutionary 
mechanisms I propose, as a part of continuous improvement can help organizations bridge the 
gap between a ―managed‖ and a more desirable ―synchronized‖ portfolio management process. I 
propose a pattern-enabled approach to IT portfolio management. 
 
4.3. IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH 
This dissertation contributes to research on IT portfolio management, in particular 
strategic alignment and risk management, along the following dimensions. I contribute to the 
literature on alignment and strategic management of IS in three ways. First, building on literature 
on business strategy typologies (Miles and Snow 1978) and the corresponding IS strategies (for 
e.g. Sabherwal and Chan 2001) I develop theoretical profiles for decision models based on the 
systematic differences in decision processes across these archetypes. My research defines the 
structural properties of a family of decision models; which serve as theoretical building blocks 
for studying alignment in decision making across different strategic orientations.  
Second, my research design and methodological approach enables me to test my 
hypotheses by analyzing actual decisions on a portfolio of IT initiatives. My research site is 
unique in that it offers natural controls for me to test the impact of differences in strategic 
orientation on the corresponding decision models. My large data set of over 160 actual executive 
decisions includes information on proposals for IT initiatives that were approved and other 
proposals that were rejected. To the best of my knowledge, my research with its research site and 
dataset will be a first of its kind in the stream of literature on strategic IS management. 
Comparing decision rules that executives use to simultaneously reject and approve initiatives 
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help me present a systematic theoretical explanation of the key selection and rejection criteria 
employed by decision makers. The structural properties of decision models I present have 
substantial managerial implications.  
Third, I simultaneously study alignment and risk-taking from the decision-making 
perspective and provide corroborating evidence based on the analysis of actual decisions in a 
multi-business organization. By using an inductive learning methodology, my research findings 
complement existing research on alignment which adopts a survey based-research approach. 
Building on literature on strategic orientations (Miles and Snow 1978) I develop 
theoretical profiles for decision models based on the systematic differences in decision processes 
across these archetypes. My research uses structural properties to define families of decision 
models, which serve as theoretical building blocks for studying alignment and risk taking across 
different strategic orientations. Though prior research has studied various aspects of decision-
making processes (for e.g. Sabherwal and King 1995, Bharadwaj and Tiwana 2005), to the best 
of my knowledge, there exist no studies that examine actual decision-making during strategic IS 
planning. Furthermore, I study decision making processes from an information-theoretic 
perspective (Quinlan 1990) thus complementing existing approaches.  
My research which combines insights on strategic orientation (Miles and Snow 1978) and 
research on the analysis of actual decision-making processes (for e.g. Tessmer et al. 1993, 
Gentry et al. 2002) helps me address this gap. My research theorizes systematic differences in 
the structural properties of the decision models: in order to do so, the complexity of the decision 
model, the strength of decision making themes and the mix of decision attributes consumed in 
decision making together help me parsimoniously characterize decision models; giving me 
theoretically grounded decision templates across the three strategic archetypes. Thus, I believe 
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that my research helps develop empirical taxonomies for decision models contributing to existing 
empirical research on decision making (for e.g. Langley et al. 1995, Sabherwal and King 1995, 
Chan and Reich 2007). 
My evolutionary findings have implications for research in at least three areas; (1) 
empirical research on routines, (2) organizational learning, and (3) dynamic capabilities. First, I 
analyze a large collection of organizational planning decisions within one large organization over 
a consecutive, two-year period by adopting a rigorous inductive methodology which helps me 
systematically discover tacit decision making routines. I contribute to the empirical research 
literature on routines. In spite of extensive theoretical developments on organizational routines, 
few empirical studies have employed the organizational routine as the unit of analysis. My 
methodological approach enables me to systematically examine properties of organizational 
routines. Evolution of routines can be explained based on the characteristics of routines 
themselves (Pentland and Feldman 2005). I submit that the appropriateness of a routine is a key 
attribute that plays a central role in guiding this evolution of routines. 
Second, my research has implications for organizational learning (March and Levitt 
1988). Orlikowski (1996) maintained that perspectives on change such as the planned change 
(Burns and Stalker 1961), technological imperative (Smith and Marx 1994) and punctuated 
equilibrium (Sabherwal et al. 2001) perspective often neglect the emergent nature of change. 
Change and organizational learning can be emergent (Mintzberg and Waters 1985). Such change 
is not planned and choreographed, but it often occurs as a result of incremental adjustments in 
organizational action. Emergent change is thus realized in slow, constant, cumulative 
organizational action. Since actions taken by organizational members either reproduce existing 
routines or alter them; I propose two evolutionary mechanisms of change: (1) evolutionary paths 
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that challenge the status quo and (2) evolutionary paths that adopt or adapt existing routines. I 
proposed attributes of routines that are likely to guide the choice of either of these two 
evolutionary mechanisms. Often, as is the case for prioritizing and planning for large IT 
portfolios, routines employed by actors are often tacit and the ―script‖ is not often written down 
for organizational actors to enact. I submit that it is the logic of appropriateness that serves as an 
internal compass guiding organizational learning especially when actions are guided by 
knowledge that largely remains tacit. I maintain that emergent change (Mintzberg and Waters 
1985) can be characterized by systematic evolutionary patterns. March (1981, p. 564) states that: 
―change takes place because most of the time most people in an organization do about what they 
are supposed to do; that is; they are intelligently attentive to their environments and their jobs."  I 
contribute to research on organizational learning by proposing that logic of appropriateness — 
organizational actors doing what they are supposed to do — serves as a key internal driving force 
in achieving a more effective repertoire of routines.  
Third, my study has implications for research on dynamic capabilities.  Teece et al. 
(1997) define dynamic capabilities as "the firm's ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure 
internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing environments" (p. 516). Rapidly 
changing environments seem necessary for the existence of dynamic capabilities. Alternatively, 
Zollo and Winter define a dynamic capability as ―a learned, stable pattern of collective activity 
through which an organization systematically generates and modifies its operating routines in 
pursuit of improvement effectiveness‖ (2002, p. 340). By avoiding the tautology of defining 
capability as ability, they identify routines as the object on which dynamic capabilities operate. 
Dynamic capabilities are structured and persistent. An organization that adapts to crises in a 
creative but disjointed way is not exercising a dynamic capability. Dynamic capabilities are 
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exemplified by an organization that adapts its operating routines through a stable process 
dedicated to improvements and learning investments.  
Learning investments can offer payoffs over time. Argyres et al. (2007) examine the 
evolution of contracting and find that contingency planning and task-descriptions act as 
complements. This complementarity results from learning spillovers between these two 
contractual provisions. These investments suggest that organizations learn to improve the 
appropriateness of their contracts as they do so in their other internal activities. I examine 
learning investments in planning; a key internal managerial activity. Dynamic capabilities have 
been invoked (Malhotra et al. 2005, Banker et al. 2006, Rai et al. 2006), yet few studies have 
examined dynamic capabilities by focusing on routines. I discover routines and track the 
outcomes of their evolution over a two- year period. My research suggests that rules based on the 
logic of appropriateness serve as self-enforcing mechanisms; when internalization is incomplete, 
rule following is enforced by other actors. I highlight the role of appropriateness (compliance 
internalized as a part of identity) in guiding improvements in the effectiveness of planning. 
Based on the two mechanisms of change proposed in my research — (1) challenging the status 
quo and (2) adapting and adopting the status quo — actors can improve the effectiveness of their 
decision making.  
I adopt an inductive methodology which helps me discover stable, learned patterns of 
evolution. An outcome of this rigorous methodological approach is Figure 7; which represents a 
consistent, evolutionary process. Figure 7 is a meta-routine and gives us the much needed visual 
vocabulary for articulating dynamic capabilities. To the best of my knowledge, my study is the 
first of its kind and gives us an intuitive understanding of the anatomy of dynamic capabilities.  
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4.4. FUTURE WORK 
This dissertation research can be enriched and extended along several dimensions. First, 
challenges associated with research on formal planning revolve around choosing a suitable 
dependent variable. The anticipated outcome ultimately associated with successful IT planning is 
improved organizational performance. Such outcomes are causally distant from the decision 
making rationale employed during the planning. Quality of the plans, as a dependent variable, 
developed has a more direct causal relationship (Byrd et al. 1995). Investigation on how plans 
actually affect an organization’s performance would require a separate study of the 
implementation process itself. Such a study could be an extension to the analyses conducted for 
this dissertation. In such a study, the quality of the plan would be a key independent variable, 
with organizational performance as a dependent variable.  
Second, data from additional large multi-business organizations could enrich the findings 
presented in this dissertation. These additional steps could improve the generalizability of the 
findings presented in this dissertation. 
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APPENDIX A: DETERMINATION OF THE STRATEGIC ORIENTATION 
 
The multi-business subsidiary, I choose for this study, is in the manufacturing sector. The three 
business units, from this subsidiary, considered in this study are developing fundamental 
technologies and serving industrial clients. This subsidiary has seven business units in total. Only 
three business units were chosen for this study as they could be successfully classified using the 
Defender-Prospector-Analyzer typology. 
 
The strategic orientations of business units within this subsidiary were identified by using 
a two-stage process. (1) Analysis the annual reports of this organization and (2) further 
validation based on semi-structured interviews with key informants within the organization.  
 
The two strategic orientations, Defenders and Prospectors, are most distinct and represent 
ends of the spectrum. They differ systematically across three dimensions: (1) the entrepreneurial, 
(2) engineering and (3) administrative dimension. Content themes for characterizing the 
differences along these dimensions across Defenders and Prospectors were developed based on 
prior research (Kabanoff and Brown 2008). The annual report of this organization was studied to 
investigate the presence of these content themes to guide my classification. For instance, the 
frequency with which these content themes appeared (when describing the strategic orientation 
of different business units) is an effective indicator of the systematic differences in strategic 
orientation across different business units (Kabanoff and Brown 2008).  
Key informants in this organization (i.e. Vice President and CIO of this large multi-
business subsidiary, and five senior business executives in the CIO office) validated this 
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classification for me. As a validation step, semi-structured interview questions were developed 
based on related prior research (Sabherwal and Chan 2001). Interviews with these informants 
revealed corroborating evidence for my classification for one business unit as a Defender “…in 
spite of being a large business, over 80% of our revenues were generated primarily based on one 
product, which we developed based on a stable, proven technology…[demonstrating high 
defensiveness and limited emphasis on new product development]”. 
 
Corroborating evidence for the classification of another business unit as a Prospector was 
obtained from the annual report and validated in my interviews. “…we have been working 
feverishly to globalize this business…”  “…close to 50% of our orders now come from outside 
the U.S.”  …”new customers in Country A, B, C are now buying our products…” …“We have 
new market of $4 billion in global opportunities...” …“we have effectively doubled the market 
for this great business… [indicating high-risk taking tendencies and very high proactiveness].” 
My classifications were validated relying on additional measures (size and R&D intensity) 
presented in prior research (Sabherwal and Sabherwal 2007). As an additional validation step, 
size of the Defender was ascertained to be larger than that of the Prospector; where as the R&D 
intensity of the Prospector is expected to be higher than that of the Defender.  
 
Based on the presence of mixed content themes in the annual reports, one business unit 
within this subsidiary was classified as an Analyzer. Longitudinal data spanning a consecutive 
two-year period were obtained from this business unit. This longitudinal data were analyzed for 
the second study. Executives in this business place a heavy emphasis on analysis of factors 
external/internal sources of uncertainties (indicating high analysis). This business, in the past has 
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produced innovations that have fundamentally changed their industry and now are choosing to 
explore new opportunities with caution (indicating high risk aversion). My informants had 
worked in this business and were familiar with the operations of this business. My evaluation of 
this business, as an Analyzer, was unanimously validated by all my informants. 
  
 
